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Dollars and Death 
 
Eric A. Posner* and Cass R. Sunstein** 
 
 
Abstract. Administrative regulations and tort law both impose controls on activities that 
cause mortality risks, but they do so in puzzlingly different ways. Under a relatively new 
and still-controversial procedure, administrative regulations rely on a fixed value of a 
statistical life representing the hedonic loss from death. Under much older law, tort law in 
most states excludes hedonic loss from the calculation of damages, and instead focuses on 
loss of income, which regulatory policy ignores. Regulatory policy also disregards losses to 
dependents; tort law usually allows dependents to recover for loss of support. Regulatory 
policy generally treats the loss of the life of a child as equivalent to the loss of the life of an 
adult; tort law usually treats the loss of the life of a child as less valuable. Regulatory policy 
implicitly values foreigners as equal to Americans; tort law does not. We argue that both 
areas of law make serious mistakes in valuing life and that each should learn from the 
other. Regulatory policy properly focuses on hedonic loss from death, and tort law should 
adopt this approach. But regulatory policy should imitate tort law’s individualized approach 
to valuing the loss from death, including its inclusion of losses to dependents. If these 
changes were made, tort awards would be more uniform and predictable, and regulations 
would be less uniform and more stringent. In addition, average tort damages for wrongful 
death would be at least twice as high as they are today. With respect to dollar judgments for 
mortality risks, a pervasive issue is how to combine accuracy with administrability and 
predictability; both bodies of law could do far better on this score.  
 
 
 How should the legal system assign dollar values to human lives? Consider a 
highly publicized example. 
On September 22, 2001, Congress enacted legislation to compensate the survivors 
of the attacks of eleven days earlier.1 Under the final regulations,2 survivors were 
permitted to claim amounts for both economic and non-economic losses. The economic 
losses were to be measured by calculating each victim’s expected lost wages from 
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September 11, 2001 through the anticipated date of retirement, subject to several 
timate of household consumption or 
victim. Noneconomic losses were set at $250,000 per victim plus 
100,000 per surviving spouse and ild.3 
In all, 2,878 families, about 97 percent of those eligible, received compensation 
rom the fund, with amo   a high of $7.1 million; 
e average award totaled about $2.1 million per family.4 Hence there was significant 
varia
presu
comm
awar
varia
simu
of ru
are s
bring
ust generally accom 7 and to 
ndertake that analysis, agencies must turn human lives into monetary equivalents.8 For 
ple, the Environm
 a set of fact-specific awards 
adjustments, including a reduction by an es
expenditure by the 
$  for each surviving ch
f unts ranging from a low of $250,000 to
th
bility among awards. But the variability came amidst a serious effort to produce 
mptive floors and caps, with a “baseline” for single decedents of $300,0005 and a 
itment to allow awards exceeding $3,000,000 only in unusual circumstances. These 
ds have been attacked on multiple grounds, including excessive and insufficient 
bility.6 
The September 11 awards reflect a strong influence from tort law, which they 
ltaneously modify. But in American law, tort doctrines provide only one of two sets 
les for monetizing death. The other comes from administrative regulations, and there 
triking contrasts between the two bodies of law. One of our main goals here is to 
 the two in contact with one another. 
Countless regulations now attempt to reduce statistical risks. Cost-benefit analysis 
pany these regulations, at least if their costs are high,m
u
exam ental Protection Agency values each life at a uniform number, 
most recently $6 million.9 Through tort law, courts provide
                                                 
3 28 C.F.R. § 104.44 (2004). 
4 See David W. Chen, After Weighing Value of Lives, 9/11 Fund Completes Its Task, The New York 
Times, June 16, 2004, at A1. 
5 66 Fed Reg 66,274-75. 
6 See Alina Tugend, Lives in the Balance, The National Journal Government Executive, September 2003, at 
50; David W. Chen, Man Behind Sept. 11 Fund Describes Effort as a Success, With Reservations, The 
ee 68 Fed. Reg. 41434, 41488 (July 11, 2003); in its 
ggested a 
).  
New York Times, January 1, 2004, at B3. 
7 See Stephen Breyer et al., Administrative Law and Regulatory Policy 120-35 (5th ed. 2002). 
8 A general overview can be found in Office of Management and Budget, Regulatory Analysis, Circular A-
4 (September 17, 2003), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/regpol.html#rr 
9 See 66 Fed. Reg. at 7012. In its July 2003 regulation governing food labeling of trans fatty acids, the Food 
and Drug Administration used a VSL of $6.5 million, s
March 13, 2003 proposed rule on dietary ingredients and dietary supplements, the same agency su
VSL of $5 million, see 68 Fed. Reg. 12158, 12229 (using this value to calculate the “value of a statistical 
life day”
2 
that attempt to compensate for and to deter wrongful death. The resulting awards are 
highly variable. For example, courts have recently given successful plaintiffs as little as a 
few thousand dollars and as much as tens of millions of dollars.10 
 Notwithstanding their overlapping goals, administrative regulations and tort law 
diverge
sregards lost income. 
 from one another in dramatic and puzzling ways. The most obvious difference is 
that tort law generally disregards the welfare loss to the person who has died; regulatory 
policy treats that loss as its central and indeed exclusive focus. Consider a few other 
differences: 
 Tort law focuses directly on the loss to dependents;11 regulatory policy pays 
no attention to that loss.12  
 Tort law makes damages a function of lost income; regulatory policy 
di
                                                                                                                                                 
 
Some individuation has been suggested by the interest in statistical life-years, a measure that 
naturally produces a higher degree of particularity. Office of Management & Budget, Circular A-4, 
Regulatory Analysis, at 30 (Sept. 17, 2003), availa
4.pdf. More specifically, the guidelines say:  
ble at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars/a004/a-
method, 
udi
Longevity may be only one of a number of relevant considerations pertaining to the rule. You 
should keep in mind that regulations with greater numbers of life-years extended are not necessarily better 
mbers of life-years extended. In any event, when you present estimates based 
, you should 
ou monetize 
tements in this section on regulatory policy. 
Another way that has been used to express reductions in fatality risks is to use the life expectancy 
the "value of statistical life-years (VSLY) extended." If a regulation protects individuals whose 
average remaining life expectancy is 40 years, a risk reduction of one fatality is expressed as "40 life-years 
extended." Those who favor this alternative approach emphasize that the value of a statistical life is not a 
single number relevant for all situations. In particular, when there are significant differences between the 
effect on life expectancy for the population affected by a particular health risk and the populations st ed 
in the labor market studies, they prefer to adopt a VSLY approach to reflect those differences. You should 
consider providing estimates of both VSL and VSLY, while recognizing the developing state of knowledge 
in this area. 
than regulations with fewer nu
on the VSLY method, you should adopt a larger VSLY estimate for senior citizens because senior citizens 
face larger overall health risks from all causes and they may have accumulated savings to spend on their 
health and safety. 
The valuation of fatality risk reduction is an evolving area in both results and methodology. 
Hence, you should utilize valuation methods that you consider appropriate for the regulatory circumstances. 
Since the literature-based VSL estimates may not be entirely appropriate for the risk being evaluated (e.g., 
the use of occupational risk premia to value reductions in risks from environmental hazards)
explain your selection of estimates and any adjustments of the estimates to reflect the nature of the risk 
being evaluated. You should present estimates based on alternative approaches, and if y
mortality risk reduction, you should do so on a consistent basis to the extent feasible. Id.  
10 See below. 
11 For this and other statements about tort law, see notes below. 
12 See, e.g., Regulatory Analysis, supra note, and 66 FR 6976-01 (2001) (arsenic regulation), in support of 
all of the sta
3 
 Tort law uses a case-specific number to assess damages, making individual 
differences crucial; regulatory policy embodies a uniform number per life 
saved, one that fails to pay attention to individual differences. 
eats children as equivalent to adults.13 
, because of deference to local law, unless they are 
e outside of the country, regulatory policy generally 
ignores foreigners altogether, implicitly treating their lives as valueless. 
What accounts for these differences? It is tempting to say that the answer lies in 
the conflicting goals of the two sets of controls. While tort law seeks to ensure 
tains some truth. Tort law has long focused on the 
produc
 Tort law focuses directly on the suffering and distress felt by the decreased; 
regulatory policy does not attend to that issue.  
 Tort law generally treats children as worth less than adults, because survivors 
lose less, in economic terms, when children die; regulatory policy generally 
tr
 Tort law treats foreign victims of torts differently from American victims, 
implicitly valuing them less
killed in the United States, in which case American values are used. Insofar as 
regulations affect peopl
compensation, especially for family members, regulatory policy is designed to produce 
optimal levels of risk. This point con
compensation of those still living—a focus that naturally leads to disregard of the 
deceased, an emphasis on what the plaintiffs have lost, and an interest in a set of highly 
individuated awards. By contrast, regulatory policy, which has assigned monetary values 
to statistical lives for little more than two decades, is concerned above all with producing 
the right deterrent signal, a concern that might seem to explain the use of a single, 
uniform number for the valuation of what most matters: the loss of life. But as a full 
account of the differences, this explanation is much too simple.14 Tort law does and 
should provide deterrence as well as compensation, and if wrongful death actions 
e significant underdeterrence, something is seriously amiss. In any case the 
catalogue of differences raises many questions about regulatory policy even if it is 
focused on deterrence. If the goal of administrative regulation is optimal risk levels, 
                                                 
13 The recent interest in “statistical life-years” would value children more than adults; see below. 
14 We return to this question in Part V. 
4 
should 
suffering fe
For  accuracy with 
admini
values that to administer—and regulatory 
policy 
invite inter
against spe and optimal deterrence are the goals, 
then a 
precise cir
courts pos
loss, to all
perfectly a about 
optima
regulators really use a uniform value per life saved? Should they disregard the 
lt by dependents—and by those who die?15  
 both bodies of law, a pervasive question is how to combine
strability. A simple and uniform number, accompanied by blanket exclusions of 
 are hard to calculate, might well be simplest 
generally takes this approach.16 In addition, an effort at greater accuracy might 
est-group maneuvering; a uniform number provides a degree of insulation 
cial pleading. But if full compensation 
high degree of individuation should be expected, tailoring dollar amounts to the 
cumstances of mortality risks. Suppose, for example, that both regulators and 
sessed “hedometers,”17 costlessly able to calculate the anticipated or actual 
, from every human death. If hedometers were available, courts could ensure 
ccurate compensation, and both courts and regulators would bring 
l deterrence, attuned to individual circumstances. If administrative costs were zero, 
different agencies should offer a wide range of diverse values for statistical lives, subject 
                                                 
15 It would be possible to argue that both of these are picked up by figures for VSL: we explore  that 
question below. 
16 The most explicit discussions of varying VSL have come from the EPA. In its 2003 discussion of 
hazardous air pollutants, see 68 Fed. Reg. 1660, 1693 (Jan. 13, 2003), the EPA noted that there “is general 
agreement that the value to an individual of a reduction is mortality risk can vary based on several factors, 
including the age of the individual, the type of risk, the level of control the individual has over the risk, the 
individual’s attitude toward risk, and the health status of the individual.” Nonetheless, the agency 
announced, without offering reasons, that it “prefers not to draw distinctions in the monetary value assigned 
to the lives saved even if they differ in age, health status, socioeconomic status, gender or other 
characteristic  of the adult population.” Id.  
An extended discussion of related issues can be found in the EPA’s arsenic proposal, see 65 Fed. 
Reg. 38888, 38945 (June 22, 2000). There the EPA noted that the “factors which may influence the 
estimate of economic benefits associated with avoided cancer fatalities include (1) a possible ‘cancer  
premium’ (i.e., the additional value or sum that people may be willing to pay to avoid the experiences of 
dread, pain and suffering, and diminished quality of life associated with cancer-related illness and ultimate 
fatality); (2) the willingness of people to pay more over time to avoid mortality risk as their income rises; 
(3) a possible premium for accepting involuntary risks as opposed to voluntary [sic] assumed risks; (4) the 
greater risk aversion of  the general population as opposed to workers in the wage-risk valuation studies; 
(5) ‘altruism’ or the willingness of people to pay more to reduce risk in other sectors of the populationl and 
(6) a consideration of health status and life years remaining at the time of premature mortality.” The EPA 
acknowledged that these factors “may significantly increase the present value estimate,” but said that “there 
is currently neither a clear consensus among economists about how to simultaneously analyze each of these 
adjustments nor is there adequate empirical data to support quantitative estimates for all potentially 
significant adjustment factors.”  Id. Hence the EPA solicited comments on these issues and said that it 
would ask its Scientific Advisory Board (SAB) to conduct a review. Id. 
17 For those who are skeptical of utilitarian approaches, substitute the term “eudaimeters,” based on the 
ussbaum, Greek notion of eudaimonia, establishing a more complex notion of well-being. See Martha N
The Fragility of Goodness (1986). 
5 
to the limitation that regulatory programs often apply to many people at once; and courts, 
focusing on individual cases, would offer an even wider range of dollar awards in the 
event o
practice, replacing the crude current effort to use a single value for statistical lives. 
f wrongful death.  
Because administrative costs are high (and also because of political constraints on 
inequality18), more uniformity is inevitable; but how much? One of the most noteworthy 
features of the comparative exercise is that agencies opt for uniformity, whereas courts 
call for a high degree of individuation. Undoubtedly this difference is partly a function of 
the ex post focus of wrongful death actions and the ex ante focus of regulation. But it 
would be most surprising if the radical difference, on this count, could be justified by that 
difference in perspective. 
We believe that both bodies of law can learn a great deal from the other.19 In 
particular, we suggest five large-scale reforms. First, agencies should move in the 
direction of the more individuated approach of tort law. They should not use a uniform 
number per life saved. In addition, they should consider pain and suffering, dread,20 and 
loss to dependents. These changes would make a dramatic difference for administrative 
Second, courts should move in the direction of administrative regulation by taking 
account of the welfare loss to the decedent. This change would significantly alter 
wrongful death cases, by producing far higher recoveries in many cases. Third, agencies 
should move in the direction of courts by including the emotional distress and other 
welfare losses incurred by dependents; courts should not ignore losses of support for 
dependents (as agencies do), but they should offer more accurate and fine-grained 
understandings of that figure. These changes would increase the stringency of 
administrative regulations and promote less arbitrary figures from courts. Fourth, both 
courts and agencies should change their valuation of the deaths of children by taking the 
child’s welfare loss seriously while also accounting for the possibility of offsetting 
                                                 
18 See below. 
19 There is a third body of relevant law: criminal prohibitions. These prohibitions overlap, to some extent, 
with both tort law and administrative regulation, carving out a subset of conduct for special sanctions. By 
attending to enforcement levels and sanctions, it might even be possible to deduce an implicit value of life, 
or of statistical risks, from criminal law. Ideally, of course, legislators would ensure that all three bodies of 
 see Matthew Adler, Fear Assessment (unpublished manuscript 2004)). 
law worked well together, producing the right deterrent signal. For present purposes, however, we put 
criminal law to one side. 
20On some of the complexities here,
6 
behavior by parents. Fifth, agencies and courts should evaluate mortality risks that are 
imposed on foreigners—both resident aliens and nonresident aliens whose mortality is 
affected by domestic activities—in a manner that is consistent with the diplomatic 
objectiv
I. Back
result of the tort prior to death, and also for the distress and loss of companionship 
es of the political branches. 
This Article is organized as follows. Part I provides the background from both tort 
law and regulatory policy. Part II discusses the theoretical basis for valuing human lives. 
Part III investigates a range of methodological difficulties and implications. Part IV 
proposes reforms to tort law and regulatory policy. Part V explores the question why tort 
law and regulatory policy currently take such different approaches to valuing loss of life. 
 
ground 
 A. How Tort Law Values Loss of Life 
 At common law, victims (that is, their estates) and dependents could not recover 
damages for wrongful death. As a result, courts did not face the problem of calculating 
damages for loss of life. In the nineteenth century, however, many states enacted statutes 
that provided for recoveries. Wrongful death statutes provided that dependents, including 
spouses and children, may recover damages for lost support. Survival statutes provided 
that the victim’s estate may recover damages for certain losses that the victim incurred as 
a result of the tort, such as medical expenses and earnings lost between injury and 
death.21 Today, most states have one or both types of statutes, or statutes that combine 
elements of each type. In addition, there has been much judge-created common law that 
can be traced to these statutes. As a general proposition, one can say that courts now 
award damages on account of death caused by a tort, but the rules vary widely by 
jurisdiction. 22 
Despite the variations, there are common themes. Most courts award “non-
economic” damages, that is, damages for pain and suffering incurred by the victim as a 
                                                 
21 2 Dan B. Dobbs, Law of Remedies 423 (2d ed. 1993). 
22 Id., at 421-445. 
7 
suffered by dependents or heirs.23 All states award “economic” damages. In states that 
use the “loss to dependents” measure, these damages are supposed to make dependents 
whole; roughly, they provide the support that dependents would have received if the 
victim had lived. This may be measured as lost contributions from victims to dependents 
(housin
 
hedonic damages. Plaintiffs suing on behalf of a victim who has no future income, no 
no spouse, and who dies without feeling pain, should ordinarily receive 
r funeral expenses.25 This large category 
g, food, and so forth), or, more crudely, future income minus victim’s expenses. 
In states that use the “loss to estate” measure, damages are supposed to approximate the 
victim’s estate if she had lived a natural life—total future income minus expenses.24 
Notice that the non-economic and economic measures do not provide an award 
for the loss of life per se—that is, the victim’s “loss of life’s pleasure,” also known as
dependents, and 
zero damages or damages sufficient only to cove
of people includes elderly people who are living off savings and unemployed or homeless 
people. It also includes homemakers, unless an implicit value is assigned to household 
services. And it includes children—at least in “loss to dependent” states, because children 
do not have dependents who lose support as a result of their death.26 
 Of course, this is a matter of formal law; in practice, damages are often awarded 
on account of the deaths of people who have no income, and often damages are in excess 
of lost income. This is partly because non-economic damages will be available in most 
cases, partly because juries are given a great deal of discretion to award damages in 
wrongful death cases and are provided little guidance by courts, and partly because courts 
use fictions in order to ensure a “reasonable” recovery.27 But if all this is true, then 
                                                 
23 Id. There is every reason to believe that the resulting awards have a high degree of arbitrariness. See 
David W. Leebron, Final Moments: Damages for Pain and Suffering Prior To Death, 64 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 
256 (1989). 
24 Id., at 430-38. 
25 E.g., McGowan v. Wright, 524 So.2d 308 (Miss. 1988). 
26 In “loss to estate” states, the child’s future income will be calculated, and awarded to parents or heirs. 
See Dobbs, supra, at 436. 
hich in most households, and certainly modern 
holds, are trivial – may be given a high value. See Dobbs, supra, at 440. 
27 For example, the household services of the child – w
middle class house
8 
damages for wrongful death are highly arbitrary,28 and indeed this is the conventional 
wisdom,29 supported by our own evidence as discussed below.30 
 Only five states permit damages for hedonic loss: Arkansas,31 Connecticut,32 
Hawaii,33 New Hampshire,34 and New Mexico.35 As a matter of theory, plaintiffs in these 
states can recover damages on account of the wrongful death of people who have no 
income and otherwise would not be entitled to non-economic damages. However, the 
statutes and judicial opinions in these states do not explain the methodology, and judges 
usually leave the calculation to the jury, with lax oversight.36 In some cases, courts 
appear to misunderstand the nature of hedonic loss—for example, confusing it with lost 
income.37 
 The upshot is that it is exceptionally hard to predict, as a matter of formal law, 
what damages for wrongful death will be in any particular case. However, verdict and 
settlement data can be used to paint a rough picture. We examined data from two data 
sets: (1) an unscientific Jury Verdict and Settlement data set that provides a wealth of 
information about the characteristics of the cases (“JVS”)38; and (2) a more scientific 
                                                 
28 aside from the legal confusion, jurors do not do a good job of monetizing losses when provided 
with no clear guidance to discipline their judgments. David Schkade et al., Deliberating About Dollars: The 
Severity Shift, 100 Colum. L. Rev. 1139 (2000). 
29 See, e.g., David Baldus, John C. MacQueen, and George Woodworth, Improving Judicial Oversight of 
Jury Damages Assessments: A Proposal for the Comparative Additur/Remittitur Review of Awards for 
Nonpecuniary Harms and Punitive Damages, 80 Iowa L. Rev. 1109 (1995). 
30 See TAN infra. 
31 See Durham v. Marberry, 2004 Ark. LEXIS 179 (interpreting ambiguous 2001 amendment to Arkansas 
survival statute (Ark. Code Ann. § 16-62-101(b)) as permitting recovery for hedonic loss). 
32 See Katsetos v. Nolan, 368 A.2d 172 (Conn.1976); Chase v. Fitzgera d, 45 A.2d 789 (Conn.1946). 
 Even 
l
33 See Montalvo v. Lapez, 884 P.2d 345, 364 (Haw. 1994). 
34 See Marcotte v. Timberlane/Hampstead School District, 733 A.2d 394 (N.H. 1999). 
35 See New Mexico St. §41-2-1 (discussed in Smith v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 214 F.3d 1235, 1245 (N.M. 
2000)). Mississippi briefly allowed damages for hedonic losses in wrongful death cases, but the case that 
approved such damages – Choctaw Maid Farms v. Hailey, 822 So.2d 911 (2002) – was overturned by 
statute. See Brendan I. Koerner, What’s Your Happiness Worth?, Legal Affairs, January/February 2004. 
Hedonic losses may also be permitted in federal civil rights cases involving wrongful death. See Sherrod v. 
Berry, 629 F. Supp. 195, 205 (N.D.Ill.1985), rev’d on other grounds, 856 F.2d 802 (7th Cir. 1988); Frye v. 
, supra, at 445. 
 that they have not, citing Lengel v. New Haven Gas Co., 111 A.2d 547 (1955), where the 
y the decedent’s lost income; the court did not 
34 Emory L.J. 295, 307 (1985). 
lection methods 
Town of Akron, 759 F. Supp. 1320, 1325-26 (N.D. Ind. 1991). However, it is not yet clear whether other 
circuits will follow Sherrod. See Wescott v. Crinklaw, 133 F.3d 658, 660-61 (8th Cir. 1998). 
36 See Dobbs
37 Cohen suggests
court reversed an award of $60,000 because not justified b
mention hedonic loss. See Lloyd Cohen, Toward an Economic Theory of the Measurement of Damages in 
a Wrongful Death Action, 
38 The data are from the Jury Verdict and Settlements, Combined database in Lexis. This data set appears to 
have been generated from various local verdict and settlement reporting services, whose se
9 
Civil Justice System data set that contains little information about the characteristics of 
cases (“CJS”).39 
Table 1 provides some examples from the JVS data set; these examples are 
selected to show the range of real world outcomes. 
Table 1: Tort Values of Life 
Case State Year Facts Award40 
Sat
Uni
cherwhite v. San Bernandino City 
fied Sch. Dist. CA 2002 
school playground accident (11 
years old) $500,000 
Romero v. West Valley Sch. Dist. WA 2003 school bus accident (5 years old) $1.8 million 
Scurlock v. Twin Labs, Inc. TX 2003 products liability (drug) $2 million 
Bra
Lab . 
un v. CH Franciscan Shared 
oratories, Inc WI 2003 medical malpractice (lab delay) $650,000 
Cook v. Newm  MO 2002 medical malpractice $3 million an
Champion v. Outlook Nashville, Inc. TN 2002 police brutality $4.4 million 
Anonymous v. Anonymous OH 2002 malpractice (9 months old) $7.5 million 
Bro
Ass
wn v. LaFontaine-Rish Medical 
ociates NY 2003 malpractice (anesthesia) $365,000 
Tengler v. Preferred Unlim  ited, Inc. IL 1999 automobile accident $18.2 million41
Solis v. Fiatallis North America, Inc. TX 2003 worksite accident $12 million 
Smith v. Antoine TX 2003 dram shop (9 years old) $276,000 
Huertero v. W onths old) ersching CA 2003 police error (18 m $2.1 million 
Ventura v. Lipton NY 1999 malpractice $15 million 
Davis v. Ponce TX 2003 firefighter death in arson $506,000 
Ojeda v. Shropshire TX 2002 malpractice $1 million 
Riley v. Giroux FL 2003 malpractice $750,000 
Tipp v. Dow Chemical Co. TX 2001 workplace—asbestos $9 million 
Domback v. Kubsch WI 2004 malpractice $198,500 
Stol $7.8 million arz v. St. Francis Medical Center CT 2003 malpractice 
Ebe PA 2003 malpractice $2.9 million l v. Berkowitz 
Ega
Sout
n v. Mercy Health Corp. of 
hestern PA PA 2003 malpractice $125,000 
Hol million mes v. Harris DC 2003 auto accident (81 years old) $1.75 
Men old) $10,00042 dola v. Witkowski NY 2002 railroad-auto accident (77 years 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
are not disclosed. Thus, it is unsafe to assume that the data are randomly generated, and indeed Lexis 
explicitly disclaims that they are. 
39 The data were generated by the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research. Data and 
other information are available online at: http://webapp.icpsr.umich.edu/cocoon/NACJD-STUDY/ 
03957.xml. The website includes information on verdicts and settlements of tort lawsuits between January 
 75 largest counties in the United States. These data were randomly generated. 
ase, as in other high award cases, the damages 
and December 2001 from the
40 We do not include punitive damages, pain and suffering damages, medical expenses, past income, and so 
forth, so this category is an attempt to determine the implicit valuation of the loss of life itself. Thus, we do 
include (after death) losses to dependents, both economic and noneconomic. 
41 The driver was high on drugs; we suspect that in this c
included a punitive element, even though not classified as such. 
42 Classified as “pecuniary costs”; it is not clear what this means. 
10 
 In the JVS data set, the mean award for loss of life—meaning, usually, lost 
income to dependents or the estate, or mental distress to dependents (we tried to exclude 
punitiv
.1 million, and the median was $1.1 
million. This is roughly consis JS survey, in which the mean 
was about 9,000 and the n 961,000 for le of cases from
sts th  4
gh th e i tem v
illion, and about half the tim 45 We suspect that 
ounts are somewh w e ts that awards g
pro in T le variance in both 
tiona isd
riness, that is, they are not closely tied to the underlying concerns of the tort 
d u d .
                            
e damages, damages for pain and suffering of the victim prior to death, medical 
expenses, funeral expenses, and so forth)—was $3
tent with the findings of the C
 $3,75 media  was $ a samp  2001.43 
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Hence two points emerge from the wrongful death cases. The first is that in 
principle, the law calls for a highly individuated approach, one that recognizes a wide 
range of factors that bear on the degree of loss to dependents. The second is that in 
practice, actual awards on account of loss of life are usually well below $3 million and 
also characterized by great variance. 
 B. How Regulatory Policy Values Loss of Life 
As we have noted, agencies now assign monetary values to human lives. The 
practice is recent, having become systematized only as a result of an executive order from 
1981.48 For a period, agency figures were highly and inexplicably variable.49 With some 
exceptions, however, most regulatory agencies have now converged on a fairly narrow 
range for the valuation of life: $5 million to $6.5 million. Consider the following table, 
accounting for agency valuations in the recent past: 
 
Table 2: Agency Values of Life, 1996–2003 
Agency Regulation and Date Value of  Statistical Life 
D
M
A
Safety Requirements for Operators of Small 
ept of Transportation/Federal 
otor Carrier Safety 
Passenger-Carrying Commercial Motor Vehicles 
Used in Interstate Commerce $3 million 
dministration August 12, 2003 
68 FR 47860-01 
D
S
ept. of Health & Human 
ervices/FDA 
Food Labeling: Trans Fatty Acids in Nutrition 
Labeling, Nutrient Content Claims, and Health 
Claims 
July 11, 2003 
$6.5 million 
68 FR 41434-01 
D
a
ept. of Agriculture Food Safety 
nd Inspection Service 
Control of 1Listeria Monocytogenes in Ready-
to-Eat Meat and Poultry Products 
June 6, 2003 
68 FR 34208-01 
$4.8 million 
D
S
ept. of Health & Human 
ervices/FDA 
Labeling Requirements for Systemic Anti- 
bacterial Drug Products Intended for Human Use  
February 6, 2003 $5 million 
68 FR 6062-01 
O
68 FR 5492-01 
ffice of Management and Budget 
Report to Congress on the Costs and Benefits of 
Federal Regulations 
February 3, 2003 $5 million 
                                                 
48 See Exec. Ord. 12291, Fed. Reg. (1981). For discussion of the origins of cost-benefit balancing in federal 
regulation, see Richard Pildes and Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1 
(1995). 
49 See Matthew D. Adler and Eric A. Posner, Implementing Cost-Benefit Analysis When Preferences Are 
Distorted, 29 J. Legal Stud. 1105 (2000) 
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PA 
Control of Emissions from Nonroad Large 
Spark-Ignition Engines, and Recreational 
Engines (Marine & Land-Based) 
November 8, 2002 
67 FR 68242-01  
$6 million E
E urce Contaminants Monitoring $6.1 million PA 
National Primary Drinking Water Regulations: 
Arsenic and Clarifications to Compliance and 
New So
January 22, 2001 
66 FR 6976-01 
EPA 
Control of Air Pollution from New Motor 
Vehicles: Heavy-Duty Engine and Vehicle 
Standards and Highway Diesel Fuel Sulfur 
Control Requirements 
January 18, 2001 
66 FR 5002-01 
$6 million 
EPA 
65 FR 6698-01 
$5.9 million 
Control of Air Pollution from New Motor 
Vehicles: Tier 2 Motor Vehicle Emissions 
Standards and Gasoline Sulfur Control 
Requirements 
February 10, 2000 
EPA Purposes of R ne Transport 
Findings of Significant Contribution and 
Rulemaking on Section 125 Petitions for 
educing Interstate Ozo
January 18, 2000 
65 FR 2674-01 
$5.9 million 
EPA 
Final Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants for 
 Combustors 
99 $5.6 million 
Hazardous Waste
September 30, 19
64 FR 52828-01 
EPA 
National Primary Drinking Water Regulations: 
Disinfectants and Disinfection Byproducts 
1998 December 16, 
63 FR 69390-01 
$5.6 million 
Dept. of Transportation/FAA 
Financial Responsibility Requirements for 
Licensed Launch Activities 
August 26, 1998 
63 FR 45592-01 
$3 million 
Dept. of Health & Human 
Services/FDA 
Quality Mammography Standards 
October 28, 1997 
62 FR 55852-01 
$  2 - 3 million
Dept. of Health & Human 
tricting the Sale and Distribution 
ents 
 
$Services/FDA 
Regulations Res
of Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco to Protect 
Children and Adolesc
August 28, 1996 
61 FR 44396-01
2.5 million 
D
I
Pathogen Reduction; Hazard Analysis and 
ept. of Agriculture/Food Safety & 
nspection Service 
Critical Control Point (HACCP) Systems 
July 25, 1996 
61 FR 38806-01 
$1.6 million 
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Aircraft Flight Simulator Use in Pilot Train
Testing and Checking and at TrainiDept. of Transportation/FAA 
ing, 
ng Centers $  July 2, 1996 
61 FR 34508-01 
2.7 million
Consum
Comm
er Product Safety 
ission 
Requirements for Labeling of Retail Containers 
of Charcoal 
May 3, 1996 
61 FR 19818-01 
$5 million 
Consumer Product Safety 
Commission 
ube Fireworks Devices 
$3 - $7 million 
Large Multiple-T
March 26, 1996 
61 FR 13084-01 
 
What is the source of arkets, 
producing evidence of compensation levels for actual risks.50
consumer goods, additional sa nvestigated to identify 
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50 See W. Kip Viscusi, supra. 
51 ve ov  E. Aldy, The Value 
ritical Re orld, 2 d 
(2003). 
52 See Viscusi, Fatal Tradeoffs, supra on. 
53 See, e.g., W. Kip Viscusi, The V cupation and Industry, 42 
 to 45/100,000). 
J  Latency o f 
 J. Risk and Uncertainty 73 (2004); George Tolley et al., Valuing Health For Policy 
(1995); Valuing Environmental Preferences (Ian Ba an & K. G. Willis eds., 1999); Peter Diamond & 
Jerry Hausman, Contingent Valuation: Is Some Number Better Than No Number, 8 J. Econ. Persp. 45, 49-
52 (1994); Note, Ask A Silly Question, 105 Harv L Rev 1981 (1992). 
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difficult. In addition, agencies use a higher (average) value for loss of life to the victim 
but place no value on losses er a welfare loss, 
economic and otherwise, in the event of death. The uniform numbers, refusing to make 
inquiries that would lead to le to administer, are 
ing in light of the co outh of regulatory valuation and in light of the 
controversial nature of imag e, and more complex, 
might be expected nitial period in which assign  
number of statistical lives becomes entrenched. But these points raise the theoretical 
questio
to spouses, friends, and others who suff
ss uniformity or that would be difficult 
not surpris mparative y
inable distinctions. More accurat
valuations to follow an i ment of some
ns that bear on both judicial and administrative practice. 
 
 C.  A Comparison: The September 11 Victim Compensation Fund 
 
 As we mentioned at the outset, the September 11 Fund was influenced by tort 
principles, and it is instructive to compare the awards to dependents of deceased victims 
of the September 11 attacks both with tort wrongful death awards and with agency 
valuations of life. Table 3 displays the comparison. 
 
Table 3: Tort, Sept. 11 Fund, and Agency Valuations of Life 
System Mean Median Minimum Maximum Standard Deviation 
Tort $3.8 million $961,000 $0 $50 million $6.1 million 
Sept. 11 $2.0 million $1.7 million $250,000 $7.1 million $1.4 million 
Agency55 $5. 4 million $5.9 million $3 million $6.5 million $1.0 million 
Note: To
from Ta
 The Sept. 11 fund has a higher median but lower mean than the tort system does. 
o the lack of extreme awards characteristic of the tort system. 
                 
rt awards from the CJS data set (2001); Sept. 11 awards from Fund Website;56 agency valuations 
ble 2 (post-2000). The Sept. 11 data are based on amounts received after deductions for life 
insurance payments, and the like; they therefore understate true valuations, probably by a few hundred 
thousand dollars.57 
 
The lower mean is due t
The higher median is probably due to two factors: (1) inflation from 2001 to 2004; and 
                                
ed to the statistics for the other systems, because 55 The agency statistics cannot be straightforwardly compar
the former will vary depending on the relative size of the populations that the different regulations affect. 
Still, they give a general sense of the differences.  
56 Available at: http://www.usdoj.gov/victimcompensation/payments_deceased.html. The website provides 
the mean, median, and range; we calculated the standard deviation from the raw data (also provided by the 
website). 
57 See the examples provided at: http://www.usdoj.gov/victimcompensation/award_summaries.pdf. We 
have been unable to find the appropriate statistics. 
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(2) the much higher average income of the September 11 victims compared to that of the 
general population. Putting aside the outliers, then, the Sept. 11 Fund and tort awards 
seem largely consistent, and both are much lower than agency valuations. What the Sept. 
11 Fund shares with agency valuations is the much lower degree of variance than that 
found in the tort system. 
 
II. Theory: Why Should Loss of Life Be Valued? 
 Many people believe that a human life is uniquely precious and therefore cannot 
be given a monetary valuation.58 Calculating the value of a human life demeans the 
victim of the wrong rather than vindicating his memory. The intuition is understandable. 
mages for 
bitrary value. 
To understand how loss of life should be valued, we need to understand the social 
purposes such for assigning 
mo alues t tality a ality r
p 59 Th o 
ry poli are  goa rence. 
system has two purposes: compensation and deterrence. Frequently, but 
basic conclusion is that two approaches are formally equivalent and will accomplish that 
But for purposes of law and policy, what is the alternative? Awarding zero da
wrongful death is hardly less demeaning, and an award of an “arbitrary” amount of 
money—either the jury or the legislature should pick a number out of thin air—is no 
better. Similarly, it is hard to believe that regulatory policy should assume that human life 
is worth nothing or, alternatively, that it has some ar
 
 a practice would advance. There is no acontextual method 
netary v o mor nd mort isks. We start with tort law, which is 
conventionally said to have two goals: deterrence and com ensation. en we turn t
regulato cy, which sh s tort law’s l of deter
 
 A. Tort Law and Deterrence 
  1. Principles of Tort Damages 
The tort  
not always, the two purposes lead in similar directions. If the victim of a wrongful death 
action cannot be compensated, deterrence is still a possibility. The question we now 
investigate is what level of damages produces optimal deterrence of wrongful death. Our 
task: a monetary amount, before any harm occurs, that is the multiple of the magnitude of 
                                                 
58 See Frank Ackerman and Lisa Heinzerling, Priceless: On Knowing the Price of Everything and the Value 
17 (N.J. 2002). 
of Nothing (2004). 
59 E.g., Erny v. Estate of Merola, 792 A.2d 1208, 12
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the harm and its probability, assessed for every person who is made to face the relevant 
risk; or a monetary amount, after the harm occurs, that reflects the magnitude of the 
harm. The choice between the two approaches largely depends on questions of 
administrability.60 
 To understand how deterrence works, one must take an ex ante perspective.61 
uppose that at time 1 the legal rules are chosen; at time 2 everyone chooses how to act 
s and deaths occur, and liability and 
amage
amount of care that is 
ways. We can say that the 
ictim incurs the cost of the accident, L, at time 3. In our example, L = $1000. This is the 
the victim incurs an expected loss of pL at 
S
and what level of care to take; and at time 3 injurie
d s are determined for wrongful death actions. On the deterrence approach, we want 
to choose legal rules at time 1 that produce damages at time 3 that give everyone optimal 
incentives at time 2. 
 As is well known, people can be given optimal incentives to take care if they are 
required to pay damages for any financial losses that they cause (or negligently cause).62 
Imagine, for example, that a particular behavior, such as driving, will cause $1000 in 
losses if an accident occurs. A driver can control the probability that the loss will occur 
by taking more or less care. The cost of care increases with the 
taken. The efficient level of care is the amount at which the marginal cost of care equals 
the expected marginal cost of an accident. By requiring the tortfeasor to pay damages, the 
law forces the driver to internalize the losses that she creates, and so she will take 
precautions when the costs of those precautions are less than the expected losses.63 
 We can think of the victim’s loss in two equivalent 
v
“ex post” loss. Alternatively, we can say that 
                                                 
60  are also equitable issues here; from the equitable point of view, perhaps it is worse to compensate 
everyone ex ante for risks than to compensate those for harm when those harms come to fruition (insurance 
practices are obviously relevant to an evaluation). But our focus here is on deterrence, and we do not 
engage those issues. 
61 As should be apparent, we are not dealing here with intentional killings, as in cases of homicide. It is not 
clear that the risk of being murdered should be analyzed in the same way as the risks ordinarily involved in 
wrongful death cases, which typically involve negligence in one or another form. Difficult questions are 
raised by the evident fact that people would be willing to pay different amounts to avoid statistically 
identical risks: A 1/100,000 risk of a cancer death is different from a 1/100,000 risk of a sudden 
unanticipated death (as we stress), and a 1/100,000 risk of being strangled, or of being killed in a terrorist 
 There
attack, would undoubtedly produce its own distinctive numbers.  
62 To keep things simple, we assume throughout that only the tortfeasor can control the probability of an 
accident. This allows us to focus on the optimal level of damages for loss of life. We also focus on optimal 
s and Richard A. Posner, The Economic Structure of Tort Law (1987); Steven Shavell, 
incentives to take care, in which case the tort rule can be either strict liability or negligence. 
63 William M. Lande
Economic Analysis of Accident Law (1987). 
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time 1, where p is the probability of the accident at time 3. This is the “ex ante” loss. 
From an economic perspective, these losses are equivalent. If an insurance market exists, 
people are assumed to be indifferent between being awarded pL, as potential victims, at 
time 1, and L, as actual victims, at time 3.64 Insurers will set the premium equal to pL, 
 insurance premium, and simply collect from the driver under the 
e that the (multiply unfortunate!) victim of the wrongful death tort has 
and they will pay out L if the accident occurs. Tort law, in theory, could either require all 
drivers to pay all potential tort victims pL at time 1, or (as in fact) only drivers who cause 
accidents to pay only actual victims L at time 3. If the insurer is subrogated (as is usually 
the case), then the victim is indifferent between these two systems, as is the insurer. 
Potential victims who want insurance can use their “damages” of pL under the first 
system to pay for the
second system without going through the insurance intermediary. Potential victims who 
do not want insurance could purchase an investment instrument that pays pL at time 1 in 
return for the chance of L at time 3.65 
 Why does the tort system award damages of L to actual victims rather than 
damages of pL to potential victims, when the two awards are equivalent? A large part of 
the answer is one of practicality. Potential victims cannot be easily identified in advance, 
and many risks are difficult or even impossible to calculate. In the unusual cases when 
the reverse is true—when courts cannot award L to actual victims because the loss will 
occur in the distant future—some courts have been willing to force potential tortfeasors 
to pay potential victims damages equal to pL.66 Thus, tort law does not, in principle, bar 
awards of pL rather than L; its focus on L stems from the fact that L is a far simpler 
foundation for judicial decisions. 
  2. Valuing Loss of Life 
 Now let us turn to the problem of measuring L when the loss is death. To fix 
intuitions, suppos
no dependents, no spouse, no friends, and no income; suppose too that the death was 
instant, involving no pain, suffering, dread, or medical expenses. Putting aside funeral 
                                                 
64 We put to one side some complexities with this assumption. 
65 Cf. Robert Cooter and Ariel Porat, Anti-Insurance, 31 J. Legal Stud. 203 (2002). 
66 See Matthew D. Adler, Risk, Death and Harm: The Normative Foundations of Risk Regulation, U. Minn. 
L. Rev. 1419-21 (forthcoming 2004) and citations therein (discussing tort cases that recognize torts for 
increasing the risk of death). 
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expenses, most courts would be required by law to award zero damages, which is a 
serious puzzle. 
 How should we think about valuing the loss of life? One thought is that the loss of 
life should be valued at infinity because most people would not accept any amount of 
money in exchange for their lives. If L—the loss—is infinite, then the product pL is 
infinite as well. But this answer mistakes the relevant inquiry, which involves 
probabilities of death, not death itself. Designate a new variable R, which refers to the 
amount a person is willing to pay to avoid a particular risk of death. When a new risk is 
created—say, a new kind of manufacturing process creates new sources of pollution, 
producing a new risk of 1/500,000 in the area—everyone who incurs this risk suffers a 
loss of welfare, which can be measured as R. If the person can pay to avoid this risk—
say, by moving—then he will pay any amount of money up to R. R is thus the ex ante 
payment to avoid the risk of death. 
 It is desirable for potential tortfeasors to take account of this loss, R, for the same 
reason that it is desirable for them to take account of any other pecuniary or nonpecuniary 
loss.67 This can be done in two ways. All potential tortfeasors can be required to pay R to 
every potential victim (that is, all people who incur the new risk of death). Alternatively, 
tortfeasors who actually cause the death of particular victims can be forced to pay an 
amount of money only to those victims (their estates or dependents, or even to the state) 
such that the expected cost for the potential tortfeasor is R.68 Assuming sufficient 
information, that amount is easily calculated. If victims are willing to pay R in order to 
avoid the risk, and the risk itself—that is, the probability of death, is q—then the proper 
f potential victims are willing to pay $600 in order level of damages is R/q. For example, i
to avoid the risk of death, and the risk of death is 1/10,000, then their estates or 
                                                 
67 We are not discussing the optimal liability rule; simply assume that such a rule is in place. 
68 One or both methods have been discussed by various commentators. Ted R. Miller, Willingness to Pay 
Comes of Age: Will the System Survive, 83 Northwestern U.L. Rev. 876 (1989); Andrew Jay McClurg, It’s 
a Wonderful Life: The Case for Hedonic Damages in Wrongful Death Cases, 66 Notre Dame L. Rev. 57 
(1990); Landes and Posner, supra, at 187-89, 263-69; Shavell, supra, at 234 & n.7; Cohen, supra, at 316-20; 
Erin A. O'Hara, Hedonic Damages For Wrongful Death: Are Tortfeasors Getting Away With Murder?, 78 
Geo. L.J. 1687 (1990); Mark Geistfeld, Negligence, Compensation, and the Coherence of Tort Law , 91 
s, claiming that they require too much 
gful Death, 60 N.Y.U. 
Geo. L.J. 585 (2003). Arlen criticizes these methodologie
information. See Jennifer Arlen, An Economic Analysis of Tort Damages for Wron
L. Rev. 1113 (1985). Many articles defending the methodology, discussing aspects of it, or criticizing it are 
collected in The New Hedonics Primer for Economists and Attorneys (John O. Ward and Thomas R. 
Ireland eds., 2d ed. 1996). 
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dependents should recover $6 million (at time 3). This is equivalent from the deterrence 
perspective to the first alternative, that of forcing tortfeasors to pay all potential victims 
uch welfare or utility a dead person has, or how much 
elfare
denied damages for wrongful death prior to the enactment of wrongful death and survival 
$600 (at time 1).  
The amount R/q—$6 million, in our example—is often called the value of a 
statistical life (VSL), but it is important to see that the number is just a construct, 
designed to represent the cost of being subject to the risk of death, and not the value of 
human life in the ordinary sense. In fact the term “value of a statistical life,” though in 
common use,69 is actually quite misleading. What is really involved is the assignment of 
monetary values to death risks—an assignment of the sort that occurs, though almost 
always without formal calculation, whenever people run risks or take steps to reduce the 
risks that they face (as, for example, by purchasing smoke alarms or Volvos). 
 The point to understand is that in order to calculate optimal damages for wrongful 
death, we do not need to ask how m
w  or utility declines when a person dies. From a deterrence perspective, it is 
sufficient to focus on the decline in welfare that results when a person is subjected to the 
risk of death. The assignment of a monetary value to mortality risks is an effort to ensure 
that focus. 
 B. Tort Law and Compensation 
 In tort cases involving easily measured losses, the deterrence and compensation 
goals are joined in an intuitively satisfying way. The tort victim who loses $1000 obtains 
damages of $1000. The tort victim is fully compensated, and optimal deterrence is 
achieved.70 In wrongful death cases, however, there appears to be a disjunction between 
the compensation and the deterrence goals. The dead person cannot be compensated—she 
is dead. Because of the compensatory focus of tort law, this may be the reason that courts 
statutes. Hence courts attempt to achieve the compensatory goals of modern tort law by 
focusing on the losses of survivors. We think that the attempt is inadequate and that 
courts can do much better. 
                                                 
69 See, e.g., Viscusi and Aldy, supra. 
70 Albeit only in simplified setting where the victim has no ability to reduce the probability of an accident 
by taking care. 
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 Although dead people cannot be compensated, it is incorrect to say that tort law 
cannot, with respect to victims, achieve its compensation goal in the wrongful death 
context. Compensation is possible in such cases once it is understood that the tort 
involve
ompensate 
meon
ll be able to pass on the cost reduction in the form of a certain premium 
oses a cost of R on all potential victims at time 
s imposition of the risk of death.71 
 To see why, imagine that courts adopted the alternative ex ante system of liability: 
all potential tortfeasors pay damages equal to R to all potential victims in time 1. If this 
were the normal system, then people would be compensated for being forced to undergo 
heightened risks of death. They would be compensated in the same sense as workers who 
are given hazard pay in return for voluntarily undertaking some risky task.72 
 Now consider the regular ex post system. By awarding the victim’s estate R/q, the 
court does not compensate the victim in a straightforward sense: you cannot c
so e who is dead. But suppose that the victim has a life insurance policy, which 
provides that the insurer is subrogated to any claims that the victim’s estate has in case of 
wrongful death. In addition to getting the regular benefits of a life insurance policy, all 
potential victims who have life insurance would receive R in the form of the reduction in 
the life insurance premium. Because the insurer has the right to R/q in case of a wrongful 
death, it wi
reduction. In short, the risky behavior imp
1, but at the same time all potential victims are compensated via the intermediation of an 
insurance company at time 1.73 Thus, tort law can serve its compensatory function in 
wrongful death cases, albeit in an indirect way and only with the help of a market 
intermediary.74  
 To be sure, this is not what people usually mean by compensation in tort cases. 
The usual notion is that if one person commits a wrongful act that injures another person, 
                                                 
71 We assume that there is no hedonic loss, such as dread, associated with the risk. If there is, then 
additional compensation may be necessary. See Adler, supra. 
72 See W. Kip Viscusi, Risk by Choice (1983). 
73 Cf. Cohen, supra, at 338 (discussing a market in wrongful death actions). 
74 A related literature discusses 
pain and suffering. Shavell argue
whether tort law should award damages for nonpecuniary losses such as 
s that compensation for pain and suffering damages serves no insurance 
purpose, because there is no reason to believe that the marginal value of a dollar for a person is higher 
when he endures pain and suffering than when he does not. See Shavell, supra, at 228. For a contrasting 
view, see Steven P. Croley and Jon D. Hanson, The Nonpecuniary Costs Of Accidents: Pain-And-Suffering 
Rev. 1785 (1995). In the case of death, the victim himself cannot be 
ependents, not insureds. 
Damages In Tort Law, 108 Harv. L. 
insured against his own death in the sense of being made indifferent between life and death; life insurance 
payouts are to d
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the wrongdoer should compensate the victim for the loss. This principle yields 
straightforward legal results in ordinary cases. If the tortfeasor destroys the victim’s 
automobile, then damages should equal the value of the automobile or the cost of 
replacing it. Such damages would make the victim whole. However, damages cannot 
ompen
 subjected to 
t of victims.77 
time 3. As we noted above, nothing about deterrence theory requires that the payments go 
t is that people know that 
c sate the victim of a wrongful death tort because the money has no value for a 
person who is dead. On this view, courts’ refusal to award damages for loss of life is, 
from a strictly compensatory perspective, correct. 
 To avoid this odd result, some scholars have suggested that a risk of death is a 
harm; in their view, people should have a claim for tort damages if they are
risks of death.75 Others have expressed doubts about whether a risk can be a harm,76 but if 
this debate is resolved in favor of the risk-is-harm view, then we are back to our earlier 
claim: it is proper to award damages of R in case of risk imposition. We add only that 
compensation can take the form of R/q in the case of death at time 3, as well as R for all 
potential victims at time 1, as long as potential victims purchase insurance and insurance 
premia adjust. 
 C. Regulatory Policy 
  1. Agencies and Deterrence.  
With respect to valuing the loss of life, the implications of our deterrence 
argument is the same for regulatory law as for tort law. In order to provide optimal 
deterrence of behavior that cause a risk of death, the individual or firm that engages in 
this behavior should internalize R, so long as we are not concerned with the potentially 
negligent conduc
 As we have seen, tort principles suggest that the people who impose risks on 
others should either pay R to all affected persons at time 1, or R/q to all actual victims at 
to the potential victims or the estates or dependents of victims. For deterrence purposes, 
payments could even go to the government. All that is importan
                                                 
75 See Christopher H. Schroeder, Corrective Justice and Liability for Increasing Risks, 37 UCLA L. Rev. 
439 (1990). 
76 See, e.g., Adler, supra; Matthew D. Adler, Against “Individual Risk”: A Sympathetic Critique of Risk 
Assessment (unpublished m.s. 2004); Claire Finkelstein, Is Risk a Harm?, 151 U. Pa. L. Rev. 963 (2003); 
Ariel Porat and Alex Stein, Tort Liability Under Uncertainty 101-115 (2001). 
77 For the sake of simplicity we are bracketing that issue. 
22 
they will have to pay for imposing risks on other people, and will have to pay an amount 
equal to the victims’ willingness to pay to avoid the risk.78 Payment to victims, potential 
victims, dependents, and estates may provide other kinds of incentives, such as the 
incentive to bring lawsuits, and these incentives might be valuable, but they should be 
kept separate at the theoretical level. 
 Federal regulations do not require firms to pay damages to people who are killed 
as a result of their behavior. Instead, regulatory agencies direct firms to take precautions 
ke precautions such that the joint costs of precautions and expected losses 
re min f the firm’s activities impose a 1/10,000 risk on 1 million 
$500 per person, then the firm is implicitly 
causing
 behavior of the firm and similar firms. In the regulatory 
                                                
that (in theory) are the precautions that the firms would take if they were subject to 
(optimal) tort liability. If the firms fail to take these precautions, they are fined or 
punished in some other way. To determine the optimal level of precautions, agencies 
must perform on their own the calculations that tort law leaves to the potential tortfeasor. 
Thus, when firms impose risks of death on people, agencies must value those risks, just 
as in tort law. The analysis is the same as in tort theory. If a firm’s behavior increases the 
risk of death by q, and people are willing to pay R to avoid that risk, then the firm should 
be ordered to ta
a imized. For example, i
people, and the cost of incurring the risk is 
 harm of $500 million. One can conceptualize this equivalently as causing $500 of 
harm to 1 million people or $5 million of harm to 100 people, those who actually die as a 
result of the behavior. The regulatory agency uses these figures in a cost-benefit analysis: 
if these costs are greater than the benefits from the firm’s activities, then the agency will 
issue regulations that restrict the
context, this is in fact the standard theory of valuation of statistical lives79 (what we 
prefer to call valuation of statistical mortality risks). 
 Tort law and regulatory law, then, require decisionmakers to attach a value to R, 
the amount of money a person will pay to avoid a risk of death. But R is not the only loss 
 
ther the legal system should use willingness to pay or willingness to accept. On the difference, 
eparing Economic Analyses 
78 Or under negligence law, only if they do not take the cost-justified precautions. We also bracket the 
question whe
see Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch, & Richard H. Thaler, Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect 
and the Coase Theorem, 98 J. Pol. Econ. 1325 (1990). 
79 See, e.g., W. Kip Viscusi, Fatal Tradeoffs (1994); EPA, Guidelines for Pr
(2000); Circular C-4, supra note. 
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that is imposed when a person dies. We have briefly described the general approach to 
the valuation of R; Part III goes into more detail. 
  2. Coordinating Judicial and Agency Behavior.  
According to standard wisdom in law and economics, tort law and regulatory law 
have redundant functions: both deter cost-unjustified behavior. Reliance on one rather 
it. Such an agency would avoid the 
incentives. If federal agencies acted like the FCDA, compensation would not be 
necessary via the tort system. And if courts acted like the FCDA, compensating people 
than the other should depend on their special investigation and enforcement advantages.80 
In the regulatory context, a significant disadvantage is that agencies need a great deal of 
information, on both the cost and the benefit side, to produce optimal regulations. By 
contrast, damage rules for torts require courts to assess costs alone. If the two systems 
overlap—if, as is often the case, they govern the same behavior—they may interact in 
complex ways. If both systems are optimal, and as a result people would take appropriate 
care if either were in place, the regulatory system will generate unnecessary 
administrative costs and possibly excessive deterrence. Suppose, for example, that the 
rules of tort liability and damages imposed the proper incentives; if so, there would be no 
need for regulations, which could introduce distortions. Regulations are necessary largely 
because many of those who are harmed by private conduct are unlikely to bring suit and 
to receive compensation. In the context of air pollution, for example, chains of causation 
are exceedingly difficult to trace, and those who fall prey to life-threatening or fatal 
diseases are unlikely to know that pollution is responsible. Because of collective action 
problems and informational deficits, tort law will not provide adequate incentives even if 
it is optimally tailored. 
 We can clarify the problem by imagining the existence of a single agency, say the 
Federal Compensation and Deterrence Agency (FCDA), with the task of ensuring optimal 
deterrence and of compensating those who deserve 
redundancy that is a possible outcome of parallel systems of tort law and agency 
regulation. It would also see compensation as part of the provision of appropriate 
while creating proper incentives, there would be no need for agency regulations. 
                                                 
80 For example, agencies can better deter behavior that produces harm with long latency periods. See 
Shavell, supra, at 277-86. 
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So long as the two systems are in place, they should be designed so as to be 
complementary—a task that has yet to be attempted and that we will not explore here. In 
the real world,  the existence of two systems is likely to be harmless, at least most of the 
time. P
. Even though both tort law and the agencies use valuations that 
eople who take cost-justified precautions avoid fines (from regulatory agencies) 
and damage payments (from tort victims); people who take suboptimal precautions risk 
both. In theory, then, people whose behavior is regulated by both systems will not be 
overdeterred.81 If one system is optimal and the other is suboptimal, however, it is 
important that the suboptimal system yield to the other; regulatory preemption may 
accomplish this task when regulations impose the proper level of care and when tort 
liability would distort incentives. 82 
A more interesting difficulty arises when two activities that are partial (or full) 
substitutes are regulated by different systems that rely on different valuations. Consider, 
for example, automobile travel, which is mainly but not entirely regulated by the tort 
system (regulations affect the design of cars and highways, too) and short-haul air travel, 
which is mainly but not entirely regulated by agencies (tort law also matters, of course). 
Suppose that agencies and tort law use reasonable but different life valuations. This may 
distort incentives and cause people to substitute from driving to flying or vice versa. To 
see why, focus on the valuation of lives of third parties (on the ground victims of air 
crashes, pedestrians). If tort law values victims less than regulatory law, then—all else 
equal—driving will be cheaper than flying. So some people who would otherwise prefer 
to fly will drive instead
are within the reasonable range, it would be better if they both use the same valuation 
than if they use different valuations, even if one must arbitrarily pick one number from 
the range.  
                                                 
81 In simple models, tort damages for negligence can be arbitrarily higher than the actual loss, and optimal 
deterrence will still be obtained; however, this result does not necessarily hold in more complex models, 
where damages may provide victims perverse incentives to engage in contributory negligence or otherwise 
expose themselves to the regulated activity “too much.” But even if there is an optimal level of
the government can set the fines for regulatory violations such that the expected tort damages pl
 damages, 
us fines 
equal the optimal level. 
82 See, e.g., Alan Schwartz, Proposals for Products Liability Reform: A Theoretical Synthesis, 97 Yale L.J. 
353, 388-92 (1988) (arguing that compliance with regulations should immunize firms from product 
liability). 
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This point suggests that it would be valuable for the federal government to create 
an agency or commission that determines focal or recommended valuations, and urges 
courts to adopt them, taking advantage of the willingness of courts to allow themselves to 
be influenced by agency judgments in other contexts. Consider, for example, a Federal 
Loss Valuation Commission, one that would set forth guidelines for determining the 
value of loss of life, loss of spouse, grief, and so forth, for use by courts in tort cases and 
by regulatory agencies in their cost-benefit analyses. The guidelines might or might not 
be purely advisory, but in any event they would tend to bring about a greater uniformity 
and also stimulate more systematic thinking about valuation of losses. But investigation 
of this possibility would take us well beyond our central concerns here. 
 
e ground that it represents the median in the relevant studies.  But there is a 
risk of arbitrariness in fastening on that median figure, certainly if we lack reason to 
believe that the relevant study is the most accurate. In fact a more general look at the 
VSL data produces further puzzles and wider ranges. Some studies find no compensating 
III. What Is the Value of the Loss of Life? 
 A. General Issues 
We have seen that agency practices grow out of real-world evidence involving 
labor markets. In principle, this is a reasonable start under the framework we are 
elaborating. Regulators are attempting to produce the optimal level of deterrence by 
reference to actual market valuation of statistical risks. Nonetheless, serious questions 
might be raised about the use of these studies by EPA and other agencies.  
  1. Uniform Numbers or Variable Numbers  
The underlying studies of market behavior show significant variety in the crucial 
figures, ranging from $0.7 million, in 1997 dollars, to $16.3 million.83 Recently OMB 
stressed that a “substantial majority of the resulting estimates of VSL vary from roughly 
$1 million to $10 million per statistical life.”84 The EPA has adopted the $6.1 million 
figure on th 85
                                                 
83 See EPA, Guidelines for Preparing Economic Analyses 89 (2000). For a detailed outline and discussion, 
see Richard W. Parker, Grading the Government, 70 U Chi L Rev 1345, 1485-86 (2003). 
84 Circular A-4, supra, at 30. 
85 Id. 
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differentials at all, indicating a VSL of zero86—implausibly low, to say the least, for 
purposes of policy. Others find that non-unionized workers receive negative 
compensating differentials for risk, that is, they appear to be paid less because they face 
mortality risks.87 Another study finds that African-Americans receive no significant 
compensating wage differential and hence that their particular VSL is zero.88 On the other 
hand, it is possible to find studies finding a VSL not below the range in Table 2 but above 
it; consider the finding that for people who choose jobs with low level risks, the VSL is 
as much as $22 million.89 The most recent meta-study, far more comprehensive than 
EPA’s own analysis, finds that most studies produce a range of between $3.8 million and 
$9 million.90 An obvious issue is the grounds for these nontrivial differences. 
 2. Worker Ignorance  
o worker ignorance. Perhaps workers are 
nawar hey are running. If so, the labor market studies do not really 
show h
he ground that 
ey and statistical risks. Under 
the cur
k
                                                
 
A different objection would point t
u e of the risks that t
ow workers are trading off risks for money, and hence they are essentially useless. 
This objection cannot be simply dismissed. But current agency practice depends on the 
judgment that the numerous studies of risk premiums indicate that sufficient numbers of 
workers are informed to establish a “price” for additional increments of safety.91 If that 
judgment is incorrect, then the current numbers need to be rethought, on t
labor markets do not show informed tradeoffs between mon
rent theory, the regulators’ task would be to use other tools, perhaps contingent 
valuation studies, to establish those tradeoffs.  
  3. Worker Coercion  
Do workers voluntarily trade risks for dollars? An obvious objection would be 
that many of the relevant workers have few options, and hence their mar et behavior—
trading off a risk of 1/10,000, say, for an apparently low sum—is in an important sense 
involuntary.92 If taken as a normative claim about voluntariness, the claim may be right: 
 
86 See Peter Dorman and P. Hagstrom, Wage Compensation for Dangerous Work Revisited, 52 Industrial 
and Labor Relations Rev. 116 (1998). 
87 Viscusi and Aldy, supra note, at 44.  
88 Leeth and Ruser, supra note. 
ote; Viscusi and Aldy. 
Frank Ackerman and Lisa Heinzerling, Priceless (2003). 
89 Viscusi and Aldy, supra note, at 23. 
90 See id., at 18. 
91 See W. Kip Viscusi, supra n
92 See 
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When people have few or bad options, their choices might not count as voluntary. But if 
taken as an objection to VSL studies, the claim is less helpful. Under the theory that we 
have outlined, the question is how much people are willing to pay to eliminate specified 
risks. Of course people are willing to pay less, for risk reduction, if they have less to pay. 
Note also that the VSL numbers for workers are not radically different from the 
corresponding numbers generated by purchases of cars, housing, and so forth93—a fact 
that weakens the suggestion that coercion lies behind the employment figures. 
In any case government does workers no favors by requiring them to “buy” more 
health protection than they want. Suppose, for example, that workers are generally 
willing to accept $600 to run a risk of 1/10,000. If an agency bans that deal, and forbids 
 price, it will not improve workers’ welfare. This is 
simply 
 people really show the same VSL for 
g cancer, car crashes, plane crashes, strokes, and 
Alzhei
                                                
workers from running that risk at that
a specific example of the general proposition that when people’s circumstances 
lead them to make harsh deals, they are usually not helped when government blocks 
those deals. Of course the analysis would be different when those who receive the 
benefits of regulation do not also pay for it.94 
  4. Uniformity and Individuation  
Agency regulations use a single value for a statistical life, but a moment’s 
reflection should be enough to show that by the very theory that agencies now use, this is 
a blunder.95 There are several problems here. 
First, people will almost certainly show a large difference in the dollar value of 
statistically identical mortality risks.96 Would
1/100,000 risks of deaths from lun
mer’s disease? An affirmative answer would be extremely surprising, and a great 
deal of evidence suggests otherwise. The American economy contains a wide range of 
occupations and industries, and a uniform VSL should not be expected to emerge from 
 
ass R. Sunstein, Valuing Life: A Plea for Disaggregation, Duke LJ 
A-4, supra note, at 30 (rejecting adjustments in VSL “to reflect the 
. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and the Discounting of 
). For evidence, see James Hammitt and Jin-Tau Liu, 
isk, 28 J Risk and Uncertainty 73 (2004). 
93 See W. Kip Viscusi, supra note; Viscusi and Aldy, supra note. 
94 This complication is discussed in C
(forthcoming 2004). Compare Circular 
specific rule context”). 
95 See id.  
96 See Richard L
Human Lives, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 941, 962–74 (1999
Effects of Disease Type and Latency on the Value of Mortality R
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each of them. Indeed, a recent study finds significant differences across both occupations 
and industries,97 with blue collar workers showing a higher VSL than others.98  
It is inevitable that a wide range of values would emerge from studies that looked 
separately at machine operators, executive positions, sales, dental technicians, equipment 
cleaners, security guards, and secretaries99—and undoubtedly diverse values could be 
found within each category. In addition, many risks controlled by the EPA are 
qualitatively different from the workplace risks that EPA has used to generate its VSL. 
There 
se they are risk-averse or risk-inclined, and 
wealth and income. Continuing national 
income
ory, produce a higher VSL than similar 
program
is considerable evidence that the risks associated with cancer produce a higher 
WTP than other kinds of risk.100 For example, Hammit and Liu find that in Taiwan, 
willingness to pay to eliminate a cancer risk is about one-third larger than WTP to avoid a 
risk of a similar, chronic degenerative disease.101 The “cancer premium” might be 
produced by the “dread” nature of cancer; it seems well-established that dreaded risks 
produce special social concern, holding the statistical risk constant.102   
Second, both individuals and groups should be expected to show significant 
differences in their VSL. This is partly becau
partly because of differences in terms of both 
 growth means that studies from the 1970s, on which agencies now rely, 
understate VSL. 103 Equally important, risk reduction programs that are aimed at wealthy 
populations should, under the prevailing the
s aimed at poor populations. Those who have a great deal of resources will 
naturally show a higher VSL than those with little. According to the theory that now 
                                                 
97 W. Kip Viscusi, The Value of Life: Estimates With Risks by Occupation and Industry, 42 Ec. Inquiry 29, 
39-41 (2004) 
98 Id.  
99 See id. at 33. Viscusi does not produce separate numbers for the different occupation groups, but his data 
clearly indicate that separate numbers would emerge. 
100 See Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and the Discounting of 
Human Lives, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 941, 962–74 (1999).  
101 See Hammitt and Liu, supra note. 
102 See Paul Slovic, The Perception of Risk (2000). 
103See Dora L. Costa & Matthew E. Kahn, The Rising Price of Nonmarket Goods, 93 Am. Econ. Rev. 
alue of $12 million). For recent evidence 
 noted in its sensitivity analysis that the appropriate adjustment would increase the 
(Papers & Proc.) 227, 229 tbl.1 (2003) (suggesting likely current v
that the current numbers are indeed too low, see W. Kip Viscusi, Racial Differences in Labor Market 
Values of a Statistical Life, 27 J. Risk & Uncertainty 239, 252 tbl.5 (2003) [hereinafter Viscusi, Racial 
Differences], finding values as high as $15.1 million in the case of white males. In the context of arsenic 
 the EPA alsoregulation,
VSL from $6.1 million to $6.7 million. 66 Fed. Reg. at 7012. For recent evidence, suggesting that the 
current VSL is $4.7 for a full sample, $7 million for blue-collar males, and $8.5 for blue-collar females. See 
W. Kip Viscusi, The Value of Life: Estimates With Risks by Occupation and Industry, 42 Ec. Inquiry 29 
(2004). 
29 
animates regulatory practice, agencies should use a VSL that corresponds to the actual 
number for the population at stake.  
This point has numerous implications. The workplace studies on which agencies 
currently rely involve people with income that is below the population-wide median; to 
that extent, the numbers are too low as applied to a population that is more representative 
of the nation as a whole. Agency distinctions between wealthy and poor populations 
would undoubtedly be quite controversial, but they are required by the very theory that 
agencies currently use. Less controversially, recent evidence suggests that older people 
show a lower VSL than younger people,104 and that distinction might well be 
incorporated into regulatory policy. 
 The general conclusion is that use of WTP has a plausible logic to it, that variable 
numbers make far more sense than uniform ones, and that the real question involve 
information and administrability. Regulatory programs often affect thousands or even 
million
n amount for grief, distress, and loss of companionship.  Regulatory policy 
Second, the dependents are deprived of 
s of people at the same time, and full individuation is therefore impossible. A rule 
that calls for minimum levels of air quality cannot provide air quality that is perfectly 
calibrated to each person’s WTP. Nonetheless, agencies could certainly move in the 
direction of greater individuation. So long as the WTP figures are accurate, government 
does well to begin with them. Exactly the same is true for courts in wrongful death 
actions. 
 B. Dependents 
 Tort law generally awards dependents the portion of the victim’s future income 
that would have supported those dependents if the victim had lived a normal life, plus 
sometimes a 105
usually ignores the loss to dependents.106 What is the proper treatment? 
 An act that kills a breadwinner harms dependents in two ways. First, the 
tional distress. dependants feel grief or emo
su e, of course, that people’s WTP incorporates 
both of these harms—that when a worker, for example, is WTP $60 to eliminate a risk of 
                                                
pport—a source of income. It is possibl
 
104 Joseph P. Aldy and W. Kip Viscusi, Age Variations in Workers’ Value of a Statistical Life (2003), 
forthcoming. 
105 See Dobbs, supra, at 430-34. 
106 Our searches of the Federal Register database have disclosed no regulatory impact analyses that attempt 
to monetize losses to dependents resulting from the deaths of breadwinners. 
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1/100,000, a portion of that figure reflects the worker’s desire to reduce the losses of 
those who depend on him. For this to be so, however, workers would have to be pure 
altruist
onal losses. Although grief will be felt by many 
as a welfare loss, and all things equal would prefer to avoid it, they might think 
 grief if a loved one dies, and in any case they would find it 
ticipated grief, is 
                             
s as well as aware of the universe of losses, and we believe that it would be heroic 
to assume that the WTP figures fully incorporate those losses. The extent to which they 
do so is an empirical question on which information is absent. Grief and lost income raise 
quite different issues, and so we discuss them separately. 
  1. Grief 
When a person dies, his dependents such as his spouse and children are likely to 
feel grief. Grief is a welfare loss, and potential tortfeasors should take this loss into 
account as well as more conventi
nondependents as well, including friends and adult children, and grief felt by these people 
are welfare losses as well, we will confine our attention to dependents, for whom the 
emotional distress is likely to be particularly acute. 
 One reason for excluding grief is the difficulty of monetizing it. How can the 
WTP for grief be determined? The very question might seem absurd. Although it is easy 
to imagine contingent value questions that ask, “How much are you willing to pay today 
so that you would not feel grief if a loved one died at some time in the future?”, we 
suspect that people would have difficulty answering this question. Even though people 
see grief 
that they ought to feel
exceptionally difficult or even impossible to monetize the value of not feeling grief. 
Other contingent valuation questions seem more promising. For example, people might 
be asked, “How much are you willing to pay to avoid having your spouse be subjected to 
a risk of 1/50,000?” This question, whose answer should incorporate an
not fundamentally different from others that are taken seriously in the context of 
regulatory policy.107 But contingent valuation studies generally face serious questions of 
                    
neth G. Willis, eds, Valuing Environmental Preferences (Oxford 1999); 107 See Ian J. Bateman and Ken
Cass R. Sunstein, The Arithmetic of Arsenic, 90 Georgetown L. J. 2,255 (2002) (discussing contingent 
valuation study involving nonfatal cancer). 
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reliability,108 and the valuation of risks faced by loved ones faces those questions in 
unusually acute form. 
A better approach might be to find proxies. Consider, for example, the problem of 
valuing the grief felt from the death of a spouse. Studies show that married people are 
happier than unmarried people, and that part of this happiness is in part a result of 
emotional closeness and companionship.109 Although the work is not at an advanced 
e difference between the happiness of a married person and a 
widowe
 (1) and (2). 
stage, it suggests that th
d person can be quantified using simple scales based on subjective assessments of 
one’s emotional well-being.110 To derive a WTP to avoid grief from a spouse’s death, one 
would need to (1) determine the average length of time that the grief persists (for 
example, until remarriage); (2) find an equivalent happiness difference in an area of life 
that has been reliably monetized (for example, WTP to avoid disease or depression), and 
convert this difference into annual units; (3) multiply
A very crude estimate can be made from a recent study. This study shows that a 
person who is married has the level of self-reported happiness equivalent to that felt by a 
widowed person who receives an extra $100,000 per year (in 1990 dollars) but is 
otherwise equivalent.111 If the average number of years before remarriage or the “natural” 
termination of the original marriage (from divorce, or normal mortality) is, say, 5 years, 
then the welfare loss is equivalent to about $500,000 (or closer to $400,000 with 
discounting). We emphasize that this figure is meant for illustrative purposes, both 
because the methodology is different from the standard VSL methodology and because 
the methodology is very new and at an early stage of testing and development. In 
addition, the study does not quite capture grief; if it captures anything, it is the monetary 
                                                 
108 See Richard B. Stewart, Liability for Natural Resource Injury: Beyond Tort, in Analyzing Superfund: 
Economics, Science, and Law 219, 234-37 (Richard L. Revesz & Richard B. Stewart eds., 1995); 
Symposium, Contingent Valuation, 8 J. Econ. Persp. 3 (1994). 
109 See Ed Diener et al., Similarity of the Relations Between Marital Status and Subjective Well-Being 
Across Cultures, 31 J. Cross-Cultural Psych. 419 (2000); Michael Argyle, Causes and Correlates of 
Happiness, in Well-Being: The Foundations of Hedonic Psychology 359-62 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds. 
1999). 
110 See Bruno S. Frey and Alois Stutzer, Happiness and Economics 57-58, 62-63 (2002). 
111 The study essentially finds correlations between self-reported happiness, on the one hand, and various 
life events, wealth, and so forth, on the others. See Andrew J. Oswald and David Blanchflower, Well-Being 
Over Time in Britain and the USA, 88 J. Pub. Econ. 1359 (2004); see also Andrew E. Clark and Andrew J. 
Oswald, A Simple Statistical Method for Measuring How Life Events affect Happiness, 31 Intern’l J. 
Epidemiology 1139 (2002). 
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equivalent of the welfare reduction from not having a spouse (a number that may be 
larger or smaller than grief because of the wrongful death of a spouse). Still, the study 
shows 
uld be included in both 
jury aw
killed. What amount of money is necessary to compensate H for the loss of support? 
r year, and H 
that the amounts under consideration are not trivial, and indeed will be much 
higher when the decedent has multiple dependents—children as well as a spouse. 
Whatever the flaws of this method, it is likely to be superior to the current 
alternatives. Regulatory law implicitly treats this WTP as equal to zero, which cannot be 
right. Tort law leaves this question to the jury, which, without any guidance, is likely to 
produce amounts that are unreliable, unpredictable, or both. Jurors must engage in a 
difficult enterprise of translating grief into monetary equivalents and in any case rely on 
their lay judgments, which studies suggest are systematically incorrect. For example, 
people tend to think that victims of traumas never fully recover their sense of well-being, 
when in fact the grief or mental distress that results form such traumas usually dissipates 
after a few years.112 We conclude that some amount for grief sho
ards and regulatory assessments of the loss associated with mortality risks. Any 
particular number has a degree of arbitrariness, but on the basis of current evidence, 
$500,000 would not be the worst place to start. 
  2. Lost Support  
When a person dies, dependents are deprived of the portion of the victim’s 
income and resources that were used for their benefit. It is tempting to think that the 
monetized welfare loss—the dependent’s WTP to avoid loss of support—is equivalent to 
the lost support, but this is not likely to be true. 
  To see why, imagine a two person household consisting of H and W. W is the 
breadwinner, and H takes care of the house. W makes $50,000 per year. Suddenly, W is 
 The answer is not $50,000 per year (that is, a lump sum of something like $1 
million). It is quite possible that many people in the position of H will now get a job that 
earns, say, $30,000 per year. Most Hs are not likely to be better off than they were before 
from a purely financial perspective, but it would be wrong to say that they are $50,000 
w
                                                
orse off. The new one-person household receives only $20,000 less pe
 
112 See Brickman, Coates, and Janoff-Bulman, Lottery Winners and Accident Victims: Is Happiness 
Relative?, 37 J. Personality & Soc. Psych. 917 (1978). 
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does not share his income with W. H must work now, and perhaps he must pay someone 
to clean the house, but he also does not have to perform household services that partly 
benefit W, as he did before W’s death. 
 Even if H cannot work (suppose he is disabled), the right answer is probably not 
$50,00
dividuation is appropriate for judgments 
rm number could possibly make sense. For regulators, 
dealing
term
aper 
                                                
0. For one thing, W may devote only a small portion of her income to the support 
of H. Perhaps she spends $40,000 for herself, and only $10,000 for him. On the other 
side, W may invest significant uncompensated work into supporting H: for example, she 
cooks for him. The former consideration suggests that $50,000 is too high, the latter 
consideration that $50,000 is too low. 
 We can even imagine extreme situations, where the dependent is made better off 
(financially) by the breadwinner’s death. Suppose that a parent neglects his children, and 
gives them inadequate food and clothing. The parent dies and the children are moved to 
the home of relatives or to a foster home, where they receive adequate food and clothing. 
From the perspective of financial support (but not necessarily emotional well being), the 
children are better off, not worse off; the loss of support caused by the death is zero. 
These examples suggest that a high degree of in
about loss of support; no unifo
 with populations rather than individuals, it would be necessary to assess the 
population-wide mean for the relevant beneficiaries. 
How should loss of support be calculated? Consider first the death of a spouse in 
a family that has no children. As a matter of theory, a sensible approach would be to 
de ine the economies of scale from household production.113 Consider two people 
who have separate households; let their annual joint costs be C. Now the two people set 
up a single household; their annual joint costs drop to C’ because one kitchen is che
than two, and so forth. As a first approximation, ½(C–C’) would be the annual (financial) 
cost to one person from the death of the other. If on average, it takes a person X years to 
set up a new household after the death of a spouse, then the financial cost is ½X(C–C’). 
 
113 See Gary S. Becker, A Treatise on the Family (30-53) (1991) (analyzing the division of labor within 
households). 
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This figure can be derived from existing studies that look at the financial cost of 
divorce.114 
When children exist, the calculations are more complex. If one of two parents 
will incur extra expenses, for which they ought to 
e com
porated the subjects’ expectation of 
lost su
                                                
dies, then the children are deprived of the victim’s investment in childcare. This amount 
can be roughly monetized by using market data for the cost of nannies and the like. If a 
single parent dies, or both parents die, the children must be moved to a new family. 
Foster parents receive a subsidy from the state; this is a first approximation of the 
financial burden, and ought to be borne by the tortfeasor or regulated entity. Friends or 
relatives who take the children in also 
b pensated, except limited by any economies of scale (a third child will probably 
require less financial support at the margin than a first or second child). 
 Tort law sometimes attempts to handle these complex problems, but imperfectly. 
In the jurisdictions with the most sophisticated rules, the courts award only a portion of 
the decedent’s lost income to the dependents, after subtracting expenses and the future 
consumption of the decedent. The September 11th Compensation Fund also takes this 
approach. As we have noted, lost income is not likely to be the same as the monetized 
welfare loss. 
Regulatory policy entirely ignores lost support. This would not be a wholly 
indefensible approach if WTP studies implicitly incor
pport for their dependents in case of death.115 A worker who demands a risk 
premium for hazardous work might do so in part so that he can purchase extra insurance 
for his dependents. The WTP figure, then, reflects not only the worker’s hedonic loss of 
life, but the worker’s welfare loss from expected lost support for dependents.116 The 
problem is that the WTP will not fully reflect the lost support if the breadwinner is not 
fully altruistic (and full altruism is rare) or if he does not think carefully about the needs 
of his dependents in the case of his death. We think that the approach we outlined above 
makes more sense. The adjustment, for the regulatory context, comes from the fact that 
 
114 See, e.g., Robert S. Weiss, The Impact of Marital Dissolution on Income and Consumption in Single-
parent Households, 46 J. Marriage & the Family 115 (1984); Karen C. Holden and Pamela J. Smock, The 
Economic Costs of Marital Dissolution: Why Do Women Bear a Disproportionate Cost?, 17 Ann. Rev. 
Soc. 51 (1991). 
115 A similar point can be made about agencies’ neglect of grief. 
.  
116 In fact Viscusi has found that when workers’ compensation benefits are high, workers do accept a wage 
offset. See XX
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regulations necessarily protects large numbers of people, and hence estimates for the 
relevant population are inevitable. What is hard to defend is the complete exclusion of 
lost sup
 household three 
ildren 
 
port from current regulatory practice. 
How much should regulatory agencies value the loss to dependents? Our 
argument above suggests that the value should be the lost household economies of scale 
until a new two-person household can be created. For two-person households, this is the 
extra cost (or lower benefits) that result when a person moves from a two-person 
household to a one-person household. 
As an illustration, imagine that the two-person household has a joint income of 
$50,000 both before and after separation, but that living costs increase by $5,000 for each 
person; and that, on average, each person could form a new two-person
years after the termination of the old one. Now suppose instead that one person dies; the 
loss of support for the other person is $5,000 per year for three years, her extra 
expense.117 Although we have not tried to determine the actual amount, given current 
levels of income, household economies, and so forth, we suspect that the right amount 
will be in the thousands or perhaps tens of thousands of dollars per death. 
 C. Ch
Because of its traditional focus on loss of income, tort law ought to produce low 
numbers for the loss of a child’s life. Children lack dependents; therefore, tortfeasors who 
kill children are not required to pay damages on account of loss of support in loss-to-
dependents states. Whether the actual awards are lower for children than for adults is a 
hard question, given the discretion of the jury, and we do not have a full answer, though 
existing data provide some clues.118 By contrast, regulatory policy treats the life of a child 
                                                 
117 This is a conservative estimate; income and consumption decline precipitously after divorce and remain 
low for many years. For some (dated) statistics, see Robert S. Weiss, The Impact of Marital Dissolution on 
Income and Consumption in Single-parent Households, 46 J. Marriage & Fertility 115 (1984). Women also 
experience a large decline in income after the death of a spouse; see Richard V. Burkhauser et al., How the 
Death of a Spouse Affects Economic Well-Being after Retirement: A Hazard Model Approach, 72 Soc. 
Sci. Q. 504 (1991) (limited to after retirement); Michael D. Hurd and David A. Wise, The Wealth and 
n: A Nonparametric Statistical Analysis of Compensation for Anguish, 74 Colum. L. Rev. 
od 1967-72). The closest comparison we 
 Her sample size is very low, however (3 in 1970, and 17 in 1974), so we are doubtful that 
Poverty of Widows: Assets Before and After the Husband’s Death, in The Economics of Aging 177 (David 
A. Wise ed. 1989). 
118 For an earlier study, see Michael Oakes Finkelstein, Patricia A. Pickrel, and Gerald J. Glasser, The 
Death of Childre
884, 887 (1974) (finding median award of $25,000 for the peri
could find is Danzon’s data on medical malpractice awards (not limited to adults) for 1970 ($18,770) and 
1974) ($52,575).
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and the life an adult as equivalent, although if agencies used VSLYs, a child’s life would 
be valued at a higher amount because the child has a longer life expectancy.119 What is 
the proper treatment? 
 
5 and 9, and 6/1,000,000 for children between the 
ages of
iding a child’s 
eath i  proxy for the child’s welfare loss because parents are not pure 
 1. Parental Judgments 
One possibility is to rely on parental judgments. A recent study attempts to 
determine the VSL of children by examining the market for bicycle safety helmets for 
children. Bicycle safety helmets reduce the probability of death by about 4/1,000,000 per 
year for children between the ages of 
 10-14. In 1997, the annualized cost of a helmet was about $6.51. The authors 
found that, given market data on the willingness of parents to buy helmets, the median 
parent implicitly attributed a VSL of $2.7 million for children between 5 and 9, and $2.6 
million for children between 10 and 14; by contrast, the VSL for the adults who bought 
helmets for themselves was $4.0 million (1997 dollars).120 
 The problem with the study is that it does not even purport to show how much 
children are willing to pay to reduce the risk of death; it shows what adults are willing to 
pay to reduce the risk of death to their children. The parent’s WTP for avo
d s not a good
altruists and are willing to trade off their children’s risk of death against other things such 
                                                                                                                                                 
any comparisons can be drawn. Patricia M. Danzon, Medical Malpractice: Theory, Evidence, and Public 
Policy 41 (1985). In the Verdicts and Settlements data set, the median and mean figures for adults are $1.5 
million and $2.8 million; for minors $1 million and $3.7 million. According to Current Award Trends, 
supra, at 30-32, the median and mean figures for adult males are $2.0 million and $4.4 million; for minor 
males $1.2 million and $4.9 million (compare figures for adult females and minor females). What is 
striking here is that the mean for children is higher but the median is lower; the reason why can be seen in 
the maximum in each case: $55.4 million for adult males and $328 million [sic!] for minor males. As noted, 
these figures include punitive damages, and we suspect that, although on average juries value children less 
than adults, the deaths of children are more likely to provoke outrage and extreme awards. 
stimating the Implicit Value of a Young Child’s Life, 58 So. Econ. J. 186, 197 (1991) 
119 For relevant but inconclusive notations, see Circular A-4, supra note, at 31, noting that “valuation of 
health outcomes for children and infants poses special challenges,” mentioning “studies that examine 
parental willingness to pay to invest in health and safety for their children,” and concluding that “the 
monetary values for children should be at least as large as the values for adults (for the same probabilities 
and outcomes) unless there is specific and compelling evidence to suggest otherwise.” 
120 Robin R. Jenkins, Nicole Owens, and Lanelle Bembenek Wiggins, Valuing Reduced Risks to Children: 
The Case of Bicycle Safety Helmets, 19 Contemp. Econ. Policy 397, 404 (2001). See also Paul S. Carlin 
and Robert Sandy, E
(finding the parental value of the child 87 percent of adult VSL). Not all studies find lower parental VSLs 
for children, and indeed some actually find higher; see, e.g., Glenn C. Blomquist, Ted R. Miller, and David 
T. Levy, Values of Risk Reduction Implied by Motorist Use of Protection Equipment, 30 J. Transport 
Econ. & Policy 55, 64 (1996) (finding $2 million VSLs for adults and $3-5 million parental VSLs for 
children (1991 dollars)). 
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as their own utility from consumption.121 If we wanted to find out how children value 
mortality risks, we would need to look at the children’s own attitudes and behavior; but 
children do not usually have income, rarely make their own decisions about purchasing 
ment about risks. For these reasons, a study that 
attempt
as the advantage of not being 
from the figures of an adult who has that child’s future income.123 In the latter two cases, 
safety equipment, and have poor judg
ed to tease out children’s WTP to avoid risks would tell us little or nothing about 
the welfare loss from a child’s death. If a ten-year-old child is willing to pay $1 to avoid a 
risk of 1/10,000, we would know nothing about how tort law and regulatory policy 
should value his death. 
 2. Children and welfare  
What should be done? The touchstone is welfare loss, and a child loses welfare as 
a result of death. Thus, we should assign some WTP for a child’s death. Some 
arbitrariness cannot be avoided, but one possibility is to follow current practice and to use 
the standard, uniform VSL used for adults. This approach h
clearly inferior to the alternatives. Another approach would be to take the VSLY for 
adults, and multiply it by the expected number of years of life. This approach is 
consistent with the general interest, in many circles, in focusing on statistical life-years as 
well as or in addition to statistical lives.122 Yet another possibility would be to estimate a 
child victim’s future income, and then determine his VSL or his VSLYs by extrapolating 
children would have higher valuations of life than adults do, which appears intuitively 
correct.124 We think that the second approach seems the most reasonable, but there is no 
simple way to establish its superiority. 
 3. Offsetting parental behavior 
A conclusion in favor of any one of the three approaches must be qualified, 
however. The risks faced by children are, to a considerable extent, controlled by their 
                                                 
121 This seems to be the conclusion of Jenkins et al., supra, at 407, and puzzlingly they appear to reject the 
relevance of their own study and advocate use of adult VSLs for children. 
122 The approach owes its origins to Richard Zeckhauser and Donald Shephard, Where Now For Saving 
Lives, 40 L. & Contemp. Probs. 5 (1976). For an overview, see Cass R. Sunstein, Lives, Life-Years, and 
Willingness to Pay, 104 Colum. L. Rev. 205 (2004). 
123 Cohen, supra. This approach strikes us as incorrect for the reasons given in Part III.B. 
124 This would not necessarily be the view of those who think that welfare is entirely subjective. But we do 
not accept this view about welfare. Few people outside of economics think it is correct, and even 
economists do not believe that it is proper for children. See generally Matthew D. Adler and Eric A. 
Posner, Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis, 109 Yale L.J. 165 (1999). 
38 
parents, and one must be careful that regulatory policy and parental autonomy do not 
clash, leading to perverse results. In a sense, this problem is not unique to the context of 
valuing children’s lives. Offsetting behavior can occur in many contexts.125 But the 
mechanisms here have distinctive features. 
 To see the problem, consider a simple case where the household that benefits 
from a regulation also incurs its full costs. Suppose that Parent (P) is willing to pay $20 to 
avoid a 1/100,000 risk of death for his child (C). An agency issues a regulation that forces 
P to pay, say, $50 to avoid this risk by buying safety helmets, car seats, or some other 
child s w pay $50 to reduce this risk in order to avoid a 
legal sa
seem implausible to some readers.  
 out appropriate valuation of mortality risks 
faced b
would be to multiply VSLY by the number of remaining life-years, with a lower amount 
afety device. Although P must no
nction, P retains the discretion to spend less money on C. If P can save money by 
reducing safety along some other margin, one not regulated by the agency, P will do so. 
For example, perhaps P will stop sending C to school on the (safe but expensive) bus and 
put him in a (cheap but riskier) car pool. And even if P cannot do this, P might spend less 
money on C in other ways: for example, purchasing fewer toys or clothes or food. Under 
the stated assumptions, both P’s and C’s welfare will decline as a result of the 
regulation.126 
 These problems do not show that children’s VSL should always be treated as 
lower than that of adults, but they point out some difficulties with the contrary view.127 
The proper degree of adjustment is an empirical question on which information is absent. 
If parents adjust in the manner described, then it would be incorrect to base a child’s VSL 
on the VSLYs of adults. On the other hand, we do not know whether or to what extent 
parents adjust in this way, and it might 
We do not have a simple conclusion ab
y children. Certainly tort law errs by excluding the child’s hedonic loss and 
including only the distress felt by parents. For regulators, perhaps the best approach 
(perhaps in the range of the parental valuation of $2 to $3 million) used for regulations 
                                                 
125 See Gerald Wilde, Target Risk (1994) 
126 See, e.g., Theodore C. Bergstrom, Benefit Cost Analysis and the Entanglements of Love (unpublished 
 in response to regulation. 
m.s. 2003). 
127 There are numerous complications that we cannot discuss. For example, two parents; two parents who 
are divorced or hostile to each other; and parents who value their children differently. See Bergstrom, 
supra, for discussion. In addition, we might not care that the child’s welfare declines if his safety increases; 
that is, it may be fine, or good, if the parent reduces toys but not safety
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for which parents are expected to adjust (perhaps child safety seats). Tort law should 
award an amount within this range for the hedonic loss to the child from his death. 
 D. Loss to Society 
 Commentators sometimes argue that tort law undervalues the loss of life because 
sponse is that these benefits may be smaller than they first appear. Labor 
arket
ny tools at its 
onetary equivalents. It seems clear that if an accurate 
                               
it ignores the cost to “society.”128 Most people produce value that they do not fully 
consume or give to dependents; this value benefits strangers in the larger society. 
Workers produce goods that consumers value more than the price that they pay; 
entrepreneurs start new businesses that employ people; people give to charity; inventors 
invent products whose value is greater than what the inventors can capture through patent 
law; the same is true of authors of books and the protections of copyright law; there are 
countless Good Samaritan acts; and many people devote their lives to public service. 
When these people die, isn’t there a loss to society beyond the loss to the person who dies 
and his immediate family and friends? Perhaps oddly, neither tort nor regulatory law 
counts these losses. 129 Here as elsewhere, there are obvious difficulties of monetization, 
but the failure to assign any value at all is puzzling. 
 One re
m s are vast, and the cost of replacing a worker who dies will generally be trivial. 
(Recall that we are speaking here of losses of society; losses to the worker and 
dependents are assessed independently.) In addition, many people do bad things as well 
as good things, and presumably the hostile and aggressive acts must be subtracted from 
the Good Samaritan acts. Finally, to the extent that the size of the population is a concern 
for economic growth or national security purposes, the government has ma
disposal for adjusting it. Temporary visas can be issued for foreign workers; immigration 
can be increased; and other barriers against migration can be reduced or eliminated. And 
birth control policies can be adjusted to increase or decrease population as necessary. 
 Still, serious thought should be given to monetizing the loss to society when a 
person dies. Assume again that the legal system had a social hedometer, one that could 
measure that loss and turn it into m
                  
128 See, e.g., Miller, supra. 
129 In tort law, the doctrine of proximate causation prevents recovery by people whose injuries are remote 
from the tort. This doctrine seems to assume that the injuries to these people are likely to be small or hard 
to prove. 
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assessment of the loss could be made, those who subject people to mortality risks should 
be required to take that loss into account. The question is how to proceed in the absence 
f a he ibility would be to try to determine how much people are 
 tort and one from environmental 
the 
ke.131
o dometer. One poss
willing to pay to avoid the deaths of casual acquaintances. This question raises some of 
the same issues as those involved in the monetization of grief. If the relevant amounts are 
likely to be low, current practice might be justified; but a great deal of additional work 
needs to be done on this topic. 
 E. Foreigners 
 Many wrongful acts kill people who are not citizens of the United States. Some of 
these people reside in the United States, either legally or illegally (“alien residents,” for 
our purposes); others live outside the United States (“alien nonresidents”). Some of these 
wrongful acts are committed by Americans or firms predominantly run or owned by 
Americans; others are committed by aliens or foreigners. All of these acts are potentially 
governed by American tort and regulatory law. 
 Let us consider two examples, one from
regulation. In Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, a case involving the torture and murder of a 
Paraguayan citizen by a Paraguayan police official, the plaintiffs, who were the brother 
and father of the victim, brought a claim in an American court under the Alien Tort 
Statute, and obtained damages of more than $10 million.130 A magistrate had initially 
awarded them $375,000 in compensatory damages for emotional distress, funeral and 
medical expenses, and so forth; the district court also awarded punitive damages of over 
$9 million. The court claimed to base the compensatory awards mainly on the domestic 
law of the countries in which the torts took place. If so, the compensatory damages were 
probably low for the same reason that they are low in the U.S.: domestic law in foreign 
countries does not award damages for hedonic loss, but only for lost income and 
li  However, as a result of the punitive award the damages were far in excess of what 
                                                 
130 Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 577 F. Supp. 860 (1984). 
131 We lack VSL statistics for the Paraguay or the Philippines, but we do have these statistics for India, 
million (2000 US$) (Viscusi and Aldy, supra, at 28); the Philippines’ per capita which range from $1 to $4 
GDP is almost 80 percent higher than India’s (CIA World Factbook, http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/ 
factbook/rankorder/2004rank.html); the Philippines’ VSL would almost certainly be in that range if not 
higher. 
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would have been available under Paraguayan law, because punitive damages are not 
awarded in wrongful death cases in Paraguay.132 
 Many toxic substances produced in the United States contaminate territory outside 
American borders. Chemicals such as PCBs migrate across borders through atmospheric 
processes, and may be ingested by people living far away. Most of the EPA’s regulatory 
work involves purely domestic statutes, and the EPA refuses to count foreign lives when 
evaluating regulations based on those statutes, even when the substance being regulated 
reign environments.133 If it is proper to count the lives of 
to foreign law in case of torts committed 
                                                
crosses borders and harms fo
foreigners, then the cost-benefit analyses that EPA has relied on undervalue the benefits 
of regulations. 
 These examples reflect an international version of the domestic tension between 
tort and regulatory law. Because tort law in other countries, like in the U.S., is mainly 
limited to compensating dependents, foreign tort awards usually undervalue the victim’s 
loss. Because American courts generally defer 
on foreign soil, the low tort awards in other countries are implicitly incorporated into 
American foreign policy, and, in particular, American VSLs for foreign lives. By 
contrast, American regulatory policy generally ignores foreigners. Which approach is 
correct? 
Our argument so far has been that the VSL should reflect people’s willingness to 
pay to avoid risks. Because the willingness to pay to avoid risks increases with income, 
poorer people have lower VSLs than wealthier people.134 Because many aliens are 
substantially poorer than Americans, they will have very low VSLs.135 Reflecting cross-
national wealth differences, VSL is highly variable across nations.136 Studies find a VSL 
as low as $200,000 for Taiwan, $500,000 for South Korea, and $1.2 million for India—
 
132 Filartiga, 577 F. Supp., at 864. 
133 Ronald Fein, Note, Should the EPA Regulate Under TSCA and FIFRA to Protect Foreign Environments 
. L. Rev. 2153, 2169-70 (2003). See also Thomas W. from Chemicals Used in the United States?, 55 Stan
Merrill, Golden Rules for Transboundary Pollution, 46 Duke L.J. 931 (1997). 
134 For evidence, see Viscusi and Aldy, supra note.  
135 See id. 
136 Id. 
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but $21.7 million for Canada and $19 million for Australia.137 Consider the following 
table138: 
 
Table 4: VSL Across Nations 
 
Nation and Year of Study VSL (in 2000 US$) 
Japan (1991) $9.7 million 
South Korea (1993) $0.8 million 
Canada (1989) $3.9-4.7 million 
India (1996/97) $1.2-1.5 million 
Taiwan (1997) $0.2-0.9 million 
Australia (1997) $11.3-19.1 million 
Hong Kong (1998) $1.7 million 
Switzerland (2001) $6.3–8.6 million 
United Kingdom (2000) $19.9 million 
 
 In addition, some aliens may have lower VSLs than Americans because of 
cultural and social differences. For example, if people in a foreign culture do not fear 
death as much as Americans do, they will have lower VSLs, all else equal. The 
conclusion that aliens should have lower VSLs follows from the argument that VSLs 
should reflect social costs. 
 139
risk, but results in a reduction in pay of $30. Unless the willingness to pay figure is a 
product of ignorance or some failure of rationality,140 the regulation harms rather benefits 
the workers. 
 
This view might seem offensive,  but certainly as a general rule, it is more 
consistent with the well-being of aliens than the contrary view is. First, consider the case 
where a particular alien in a foreign country both enjoys the benefit and bears the cost of 
a regulation or tort rule. For example, a labor regulation requires foreign suppliers of 
goods for the American market to provide safety devices to workers. The workers are 
willing to pay $20 to avoid a 1/100,000 risk of death; the safety device eliminates that 
                                                
rd punitive damages – even 
d thus the award violates choice of law principles – 
 very high levels of damages. E.g., Filartiga, supra (awarding $10 million punitive damages, 
00 in compensatory damages). 
140 See Sunstein, Valuing Life, supra note. 
137 See id. at 27-28. 
138 Drawn from id. at 26-27. 
139 Indeed, courts’ discomfort with it might explain their willingness to awa
when they are not available under foreign law, an
resulting in
$375,0
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 Second, consider the case where one nonresident alien enjoys the benefit of the 
regulation, and another alien (living in the same country) bears the cost. A regulation 
requires factories to reduce levels of emissions: neighbors would be willing to pay $100 
to r duce the risk of death c al consumers bear a cost of 
$200 from higher prices. If the neighbors and  equal wealth, the 
regulation simp utes wealth from one group to another: it does not increase 
welfare but reduces welfare. If the neighbor ers, then the 
regulation migh but what justifi ibutional benefit, not the use 
of inflated VSLs. If the U.S. wants to effect a redistribution of wealth between groups in 
other countries use regulatory o so, there is no reason to 
limit these rules to cases of death; they could be used for nonfatal harms as well. And the 
use of inflated SLs would only obscure the nature of the regulatory 
intervention. 
ents. In any case it would normally make 
ore sense for the U.S. to negotiate with the governm
erican citizens bear the cost. Suppose that regulation that reduces 
age the ozone layer harms mainly Americans, who pay the higher 
ainly people living in other parts of the world. Consider two 
e reated by the emissions but loc
 consumers have
ly redistrib
s are poorer than the consum
t be justified, es it is the distr
, and seeks to and tort law to d
(that is, American) V
 A further question is this: Even assuming that the redistribution would be in the 
right direction, why would the U.S. want to redistribute wealth in other countries through 
regulatory and tort law? One problem is that, unless the U.S. seizes control of the 
government of the foreign country, the government will be able to undo the American 
redistribution by using tax and other instrum
m ent for redistributions of wealth, 
rather than unilaterally intervening. Finally, if unilateral intervention is to occur, the 
courts (in the case of tort law) would seem to be a poor vehicle; better to rely on the state 
department and other executive branch agencies. That the U.S. has rarely concerned itself 
with the distribution of wealth in other countries—focusing instead on trade, security, and 
human rights—suggests that indirect redistribution through tort and regulatory law would 
not be politically sustainable. 
 Third, consider the case where nonresident aliens enjoy the benefit of the 
regulation, and Am
emissions that dam
prices, while benefiting m
versions of this regulation: the first (low pollution control) is based on a cost-benefit 
analysis that values foreign lives lower than American lives. The second (high pollution 
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control) is based on a cost-benefit analysis that values foreign lives and American lives 
equally, at the American level. Under the stated assumptions, the second redistributes 
resources from Americans to people living in other countries. Which regulation is 
superior? 
 In the abstract, the answer is hardly clear, and the question cannot be sensibly 
approached without consideration of American foreign policy toward the nations that 
benefit from the regulation. Let us consider the relation between the U.S. and, say, India. 
The two states can gain a lot from each other by cooperating, but there is also a danger of 
conflict. To simplify, suppose that the U.S. wants three things from India: security 
cooperation (such as flyover rights); an open market for U.S. goods; and an improvement 
in the treatment of religious minorities. India seeks from the U.S. similar things: 
diplomatic assistance with its ongoing disputes with Pakistan; an open market for Indian 
goods; and an improvement of American treatment of Indian residents. Suppose that at a 
 will retaliate. The new equilibrium could involve a lower 
hypothetical stage 1, India and the U.S. achieve a balance between their aims: each gives 
a little of what the other wants. 
 Now at stage 2, an American regulatory agency issues an environmental 
regulation that happens to benefit India considerably, and at great cost to American 
citizens. At this point, the American diplomatic authorities might argue that because the 
U.S. is conferring a new benefit on India (say, less flooding of coastal areas), India 
should respond by conferring a new benefit on the U.S. (say, more trade). India could 
respond by saying thanks for reducing coastal flooding—that is important—but it is not 
more important to us than preserving our domestic X industry. In short, the new 
regulation disturbs the cooperative equilibrium between the U.S. and India: the U.S., 
perceiving itself as giving more than it is getting, will (in theory) respond by withdrawing 
some other benefits, and India
level of cooperation—one in which the U.S. gives India something of little value to India 
and so gets something of little value in return—unless the U.S. government can change 
the regulation in a way that benefits India less.141 
 Our point is that under certain circumstances, regulations and tort rules that are 
based on inflated foreign VSLs will redistribute wealth from Americans to foreign 
                                                 
141 Of course, that may be impossible, in which case cooperation should not decline. 
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governments. Such transfers would not be wildly popular in the abstract, at least among 
Americans. They may nonetheless be desirable for reasons of foreign policy or social 
justice, but they should be recognized as such; the use of the inflated VSL conceals the 
magnitude of the transfer and even its nature. Further, transfers—whether disguised 
ations 
                                                
through inflated VSLs or undisguised—should cohere with foreign policy; otherwise, 
they will lead to perverse results or be ineffective. The simple conclusion is that in many 
imaginable circumstances, a high VSL, for people in other countries, will produce 
perverse redistribution or redistribution for which there is no strong claim—and that even 
when the redistribution through a high VSL seems desirable (because it benefits poor 
people on balance), there are many questions about whether regulatory agencies should 
adopt it. It follows that as a general rule, both agencies and courts should use a VSL that 
attempts to match the figure in the relevant nation. 
 
IV. Proposals for Reform 
 A. Use of VSL in Regul
Tort law offers two principal lessons for regulatory policy. The first involves the 
need for a greater degree of individuation. The second involves the need to pay attention 
to the interests of dependents. A properly designed system of valuation would move 
substantially in both directions.  
 1. Individuation  
We have seen that under the theory that agencies now use, VSL is calculated on 
the basis of people’s willingness to pay. That very theory raises serious doubts about the 
government’s use of a uniform number. The appropriate value varies across both risks 
and persons. If, for example, the risk is accompanied by a high degree of pain and 
suffering, it deserves more attention than if it is not—a conclusion that is supported by 
studies finding a kind of “premium” for bad deaths.142 Agencies should therefore provide 
a higher VSL for cancer risks than for other risks, a possibility that EPA has recognized 
 
142 See Revesz, supra note. 
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in its “sensitivity analysis” for arsenic.143 A great deal more should be done in this 
vein.144 As tort law demonstrates, a uniform number is extremely difficult to defend.  
Variations across persons are important as well. To be sure, it is impractical to 
think that regulators should fully individuate risks across persons, in part because 
regulations often affect many people at once. But less fine-grained distinctions are 
possible. For example, people over sixty tend to show a lower VSL than people between 
thirty and forty.145 Regulators might build on these figures to generate different numbers 
for programs protecting people at different points along the age spectrum. Putting the 
difficult case of children to one side, agency rules should have a lower value when the 
benefited class consists largely of elderly people. A movement in this direction would 
have significant consequences for valuation; it would drive down the monetized benefits 
of a number of programs delivering health gains largely to senior citizens.  
Additional distinctions are possible. If a program would benefit largely wealthy 
 an unusually high VSL—a point that would support a higher 
SL fo irlines (the exact opposite, not incidentally, of 
current
n to this approach is that in some circumstances, a high 
VSL, f eficial to the poor, simply because they receive benefits 
for whi
                                                
people, regulators might use
V r safety decisions involving a
 practice, which involves an unusually low number for airline safety146). More 
controversially, programs protecting the poor might be given a lower VSL, in a way that 
tracks the approach of tort law, at least where those who benefit from regulation are also 
paying for it. A possible objectio
or the poor, might be ben
ch they pay only a fragment. We do not resolve the obvious empirical and ethical 
complexities here.147 We note simply that a higher degree of individuation would be 
desirable, that in most cases it would raise no serious ethical problems, and that tort law 
shows that a movement toward greater individuation is both feasible and consistent with 
longstanding practices and intuitions. 
 
 
 
143 See note supra. 
144 See Sunstein, supra note. 
145 Joseph P. Aldy and W. Kip Viscusi, Age Variations in Workers’ Value of a Statistical Life (2003), 
forthcoming. 
ing a lower figure for the FAA than for the EPA. 
147 See Sunstein, supra. 
146 See Table 2, supra, show
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  2. Dependents. 
For regulatory policy, the most obvious gap is that agency numbers do not recognize the 
fact tha
 conventional 
assessm
ere less ambiguous than it now is, well-organized 
groups would undoubtedly engage in special pleading, attempting to move agency 
practices in their preferred directions. A uniform number helps to insulate agencies from 
the relevant pressures. In the context of tort suits, individuation does not face those 
 for insulation. In principle, however, 
t a death causes welfare losses to many people other than the victim. If a worker is 
killed as a result of carcinogens in the workplace, others will almost always be affected. 
Agency failure to take account of the welfare losses results in numbers that are far too 
low.  
We have suggested the importance of distinguishing between two sets of losses: 
grief on the one hand and lost income on the other. Following tort law, full individuation 
would take account of the fact that the size of those losses very much depends on the 
particular situation. Other things being equal, the loss of a parent with six young children 
causes more serious harm than the loss of someone without dependents. If our earlier 
calculations are correct, several million dollars would be added to the
ent of the benefits of a regulation that saved that parent’s statistical life. A serious 
difficulty here is that agency regulations protect broad classes of people and hence it is 
quite impractical to think that agencies should make fully individual judgments about the 
welfare losses. But it is not impractical to think that agencies should adjust their numbers 
in a way that ensures that serious welfare losses are not ignored. As in the case of 
statistical risks, contingent valuation studies and market evidence might be consulted to 
generate appropriate numbers for grief. We have offered some suggestions about how 
this might be done. For regulations, individual assessments are of course impossible, but 
a positive number is better than no number, and population-wide means would be a 
sensible place to start. 
 In the regulatory context, there is a cautionary note. Any effort at individuation 
would have a high degree of political salience and would undoubtedly mobilize affected 
interests. Even if the social science w
pressures, and hence there is little need
individuation is clearly desirable, and it seems quite pessimistic to think that the effort to 
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produce greater accuracy should be rejected because of the possible effects of interest-
For deterrence purposes, the tortfeasor should pay the amount that the victim 
would 
tion would be: “estimate the amount of money that the victim 
group maneuvering. 
 B. Use of VSL in Tort Law 
 In wrongful death actions, damages should be calculated in the following way. 
  1. The Hedonic Loss of the Victim  
 
be willing to pay to avoid the risk that was imposed on him by the tortfeasor’s 
class of actions, divided by that risk (R/q). Damages should not be based on lost income; 
as in the regulatory context, lost income is at best a proxy for the victim’s loss. 
Deterrence can be satisfied through payment to the government, but if it is paid to the 
estate or dependents, then indirect compensation is also achieved.  
The amount can be calculated in two ways. First, the VSL (or VSLY) used by 
agencies could be used, with any adjustments as necessary to reflect individual factors: 
the defendant’s risk preference, life expectancy (if VSLY is used), wealth, quality of life, 
and so forth. Indeed, it is possible that the victim’s own wages will reflect his VSL, if he 
has a risky job. So long as agencies use a uniform figure, courts might start with the 
standard $6 million figure, and then make adjustments as appropriate. If agencies used 
more refined figures, as we have argued that they should, then courts might begin with 
those figures instead, and make appropriate adjustments from that amount. Second, the 
jury could be asked to determine the hedonic loss. However, the proper jury question is 
not “what is the value of the life’s pleasures lost by the victim?” This question is too 
abstract. A better ques
would have paid to avoid the risk in question.” 148 Of course an abstract answer to that 
question would be unreliable; VSL studies should be used to educate juries about 
common valuations, so that their own estimates will be informed rather than arbitrary.149 
                                                 
148 Arlen argues that courts are incapable of making such calculations, claiming that “courts’ inaccurate 
calculations would come no closer to efficient recovery amounts than would legislation establishing a flat 
statutory amount for wrongful death in the hope that the results would be efficient on average.” Arlen, 
supra, at 1134. It might be true that legislatures can do better than courts, but that is no argument for 
awarding zero damages or an (arbitrary) constant amount instead. Recall too that we are not exploring the 
complex issues raised by the possible difference between willingness to pay and willingness to accept. 
149 Many courts have refused to admit testimony about VSL studies, arguing that the science does not meet 
the Daubert standard. See, e.g., Ayres v. Robinson, 887 F. Supp. 1049 (N.D. IL 1995). This seems to us a 
mistake. For a discussion, see Reuben E. Slesinger, The Demise of Hedonic Damages Claims in Tort 
Litigation, 6 J. Legal Econ. 17 (1996). Some courts also reject VSL studies on the ground that these studies 
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To ensure consistent and rational awards, we would strongly prefer the first approach, on 
the ground that juries are not well-equipped to answer these questions; but if a strong role 
he second would also work so long as the jury’s 
dgme
act on tort awards, especially for the 
at the time) a hedonic 
loss sta
for the jury is deemed important, t
ju nts are disciplined by expert witnesses and the court. 
This reform would have a significant imp
elderly in non-hedonic loss states. We can already see the logic of our argument at work 
in some of the hedonic loss states. Consider Thomas v. Hilburn,150 in which the jury 
awarded wrongful death damages of $300,000 to the son of the 75 year old victim. On 
appeal, the defendant argued that damages should be reduced to $66,311 for lost income, 
plus a few thousand dollars more for medical expenses, funeral expenses, and property 
damage. The court rejected the argument because Mississippi was (
te. Although our approach would have suggested a verdict of a few million or so, 
depending on the wealth and other characteristics of the victim, the court clearly 
recognized the key point that the hedonic loss of an elderly man is much higher than his 
lost income.151 
In the tort context, there is an additional complication. Valuation of statistical 
risks has occurred for risks of specified magnitudes, usually ranging from 1/10,000 to 
1/100,000.152 Insofar as tort law is dealing with risks in this range, use of agency figures 
is fully appropriate. But it should be clear that these numbers need not be taken to support 
a VSL that is independent of probability.153 Suppose that people would be willing to pay 
$60 to eliminate a risk of 1/100,000. From this it does not follow that people would be 
willing to pay $6000 to eliminate a risk of 1/1000, or $60,000 to eliminate a risk of 1/100, 
                                                                                                                                                 
reflect the losses to other people, not to the victim who is e subject of the tort dispute. However, courts 
frequently use statistics about other people in order to award damages in tort cases. For example, when 
courts calculate lost income in order to determine damages for dependents, they use mortality tables; these 
tables are based on the lives of other people, not on the victim’s own life, which would not make any sense. 
 th
Just as courts use statistics about other people in order to estimate the victim’s life expectancy, courts 
should use statistics about other people in order to estimate how much the victim would have been willing 
eath 
to pay in order to avoid a risk of death. 
150 654 So. 2d 898, 903 (Miss. 1995). 
151 See also Motorola Communications and Electronics, Inc. v. Wilkerson, 555 So. 2d 713 (Miss. 1989) 
(allowing $150,000 award for the death of an 85 year old man); Marcotte v. Timberlane/Hampstead Sch. 
Dist., 733 A.2d 394, 407-08 (N.H. 1999) (allowing $900,000 award for the death of a child whose lost 
future income was about $700,000). New Hampshire also recognizes hedonic losses in wrongful d
cases. See supra. 
152 See, e.g., W. Kip Viscusi, The Value of Life: Estimates With Risks by Occupation and Industry, 42 Ec. 
Inquiry 29, 33 (2004) (showing fatality risks ranging from about 1/100,000 to 45/100,000). 
153 See Richard Posner, Catastrophe: Risk and Reason (forthcoming 2004). 
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or $600,000 to eliminate a risk of 1/10. It is plausible to believe that people’s WTP to 
reduce statistical risks is nonlinear.154 As the probability approaches 100%, people 
become willing to pay an amount for risk reduction that rises nonlinearly to 100% of their 
income, and—at some point—become unwilling to accept any amount in return for 
giving 
s negligence, a similar floor is appropriate, supplemented perhaps by 
punitiv
up their entitlement to life.155 From this it follows that if a defendant imposes risks 
that are far higher than those with which agencies deal, the agency figures are too low, 
and hence the tort system should use significantly higher ones. 
The sheer variety of wrongful death actions, in terms of both probability and kind 
of death, severely complicates the inquiry into appropriate damage awards. Insofar as the 
tort system is dealing with probabilities in the general range with which agencies deal, it 
can build on (appropriately reformed) agency practice. Insofar as the tort system is 
dealing with the most egregious conduct—homicide, for example—the regulatory 
analysis of WTP does not apply directly, but a standard amount of (say) $6 million at 
least provides an appropriate floor. Insofar as the conduct imposes high probability risks, 
as through gros
e damages. These suggestions are in line with our general emphasis on the fact 
that all mortality risks are not the same. What cannot be defended is the total exclusion of 
hedonic damages in wrongful death actions. 
 
 
                                                 
154 See id. 
155 There is a great deal of work on disparities between willingness to pay and willingness to accept 
(WTA). See, for an overview, Russell Korobkin, The Endowment Effect and Legal Analysis, 97 Nw. U.L 
. But we lack reliable market data about how to value much higher 
0. And for such risks, willingness to accept and willingness to pay 
appropriate compensatory award is either infinite or higher than anyone can pay. Thus, a 
ards, given that 
Rev. 1227 (2003). Such disparities are found in the context of risks. See, e.g., see W. Kip Viscusi et al., An 
Investigation of the Rationality of Consumer Valuations of Multiple Health Risks, 18 RAND J. Econ. 465 
(1987). It follows that people would pay less to eliminate a risk of 1/100,000 than they would demand to be 
subject to that same risk. See id. One advantage of the market data on which agencies currently rely is that 
the WTP/WTA disparity is essentially irrelevant. If workers and consumers who face a risk of 1/100,000 
receive $60 in compensation, the result can be described in terms of either WTA or WTP; any such 
description is simply a matter of framing
risks -- say, risks of 1/50, 1/20, or 1/1
figures surely diverge, not least because the income constraint applies to WTP but not to WTA. People 
would undoubtedly pay a great deal to eliminate a mortality risk of 1/20; but they would demand even more 
to be subject to that risk, and many people would not incur that risk for any amount. It is not entirely clear, 
in principle, whether WTP or WTA is appropriate, though our view is that willingness to accept is correct 
and therefore the 
billionaire who murders someone ought to forfeit his entire wealth. As a practical matter, however, it 
probably does not make much difference that the tort system does not generate such high aw
the entire wealth of most murderers is extremely limited. 
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  2. Harm to Survivors  
 As we have seen, calculating the loss to survivors is difficult in practice, but 
conceptually straightforward. For deterrence purposes, survivors should recover for their 
welfare loss—this means grief, mental distress, loss of companionship, and the like. It is 
less clear what dependents should recover in terms of lost support (such as lost income 
attributable to their care). The conceptually proper recovery is the amount of money that 
would make the survivor just as well off (financially) as he would have been if the death 
had no
erly, tort damages currently should be (and 
apparently are) low even in jurisdictions that include lost income, given that their earning 
years are almost over. By contrast, under our approach their damages are likely to be, 
again, in the $6 million or higher range.156 For adults with dependents, we suspect that an 
t occurred, which will usually be tied to the loss of household economies of scale 
and the breadwinner’s degree of altruism. This amount may be higher than lost income (if 
the victim does a lot of work for the household that is not compensated in the market). 
And it may be lower (if the survivor can easily get a job and the victim was never very 
generous in the first place). 
 If our approach were adopted, tort damages would rise, especially for children and 
the elderly. As we have seen, damages for wrongful death are currently under about $3 
million, based on lost income, mental distress, and the like. Under our system, they are 
likely to be as much as $6 million or higher for the average person. As for children, tort 
damages currently should be low in jurisdictions that exclude lost income (though it is 
not clear that this is the case); and for the eld
additional several hundred thousands of dollars per dependent would be added to the $6 
million baseline. 157 
 
 
 
                                                 
156 Elderly people apparently have VSLs that are either equal to (or even higher than) or not much lower 
than those of younger people. See Aldy & Viscusi, supra. 
157 If the victim incurs unusual pain and suffering prior to death, including the distress of anticipating one’s 
own death in the near future, this cost may not be reflected in standard VSLs. Thus, additional damages 
should be awarded for them. Damages for medical and funeral expenses should also be awarded. See Mark 
Geistfeld, Placing a Price on Pain and Suffering: A Method for Helping Juries Determine Tort Damages for 
Nonmonetary Injuries, who suggests using WTP estimates, 83 Calif. L. Rev. 773 (1995). See also David 
W. Leebron, Final Moments: Damages for Pain and Suffering Prior To Death, 64 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 256 
(1989). 
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V. Positive Questions 
 
 Our comparison of tort law and regulatory policy raises an obvious positive 
question. Why do these two areas of law take such different approaches to valuing lives? 
The beginning of an answer to this question is that even though the two areas of law have 
an overlapping purpose—the deterrence of harmful conduct—they also have radically 
different historical origins and orientations: tort law is ex post and individualized, while 
regulatory law is ex ante and generalized. As a result, tort law is naturally more 
particularistic and less rule-bound. The ex ante focus of regulation pushes administrators 
away from case-specific standards and in the direction of rule-bound judgments. But this 
point raises many complexities. 
A. In General 
 Tort law’s ex post and individualistic orientation has several consequences. First, 
the implicit (or explicit) valuation of human lives in the tort context is information-rich. 
Courts have access to a great deal of evidence about the particular parties and 
circumstances. Under the rules of evidence, all relevant evidence may be introduced to 
the court, and both plaintiff and defendant have strong incentives to take advantage of 
these rules. Given that the victim is a real, identifiable person, it is natural for the court to 
determine the actual loss, including losses to dependents, rather than to rely on statistical 
averages. In fact there is no need to rely on such averages, which provides less accurate 
information than the facts themselves. 
 Second, tort remedies direct the decisionmaker to compare the victim’s post-tort 
state with her pre-tort state, and to ignore the rest of society. This approach works well 
nough when the tort causes a financial loss or a physical injury, but when it kills the 
ictim, the decisionmaker has no way to compare post-tort and pre-tort well-being in a 
ay that can be reliably monetized. To determine the hedonic loss from death, one cannot 
look at the actual victim’s experience of death; one can rely only on statistical inference 
e
v
w
based on generalization from the rest of society. But in view of judicial traditions, this 
would be unfamiliar and even odd in the tort setting. 
 Third, and following from the first two points, tort damages tend to be highly 
variable. Juries lack reference points, so their judgments will depend heavily on the 
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presentation of evidence by lawyers, and on whatever anchors,158 prejudices, and 
xpectations citizens bring to the jury box. Juries might also react emotionally to the case, 
 misu
ex post nature of litigation and the fact that awards are 
issued 
 so that averages can be used. Thus, if a regulation 
e
or nderstand jury instructions, and allow irrelevant factors (like a desire for revenge) 
to influence their determination of the award. 
 Fourth, tort law has low public visibility, at least at the system-wide level. 
Individual awards may receive considerable public attention, but the system of awards—
the median award, the mean award, the variance—does not.159 Hence public scrutiny is 
relatively weak unless and until a salient network of awards (as in the case of the 
September 11 fund) is announced. The difficulties of monetization, the variable figures, 
and the possible arbitrariness of many outcomes attract little in the way of scrutiny and 
review, not least because of the 
one at a time. 
 Compare regulatory law. Regulatory decisions are ex ante and highly abstract. 
The victims of the regulated conduct are not identified, and so their personal 
characteristics do not stand out (although sometimes a disaster or crisis may provoke the 
regulation160). Whereas court cases are emotionally rich, regulatory decisions often 
(though not always) seem dry and technical, even though usually much more is at stake. 
 The ex ante and general orientation of regulatory policy has several consequences. 
First, because one cannot identify the actual people benefited by a regulation, one must 
rely on averages. The usual notion is that although all individuals are different, 
differences will balance each other out,
protects people of type X with a VSL of $7 million and people of type Y with a VSL of 
$5 million, regulators use the average valuation of $6 million for a regulation that affects 
people evenly divided into the two types. 
 
                                                 
158 On the relevance of anchors, see Gretchen Chapman and Eric Johnson, in Heuristics and Biases: The 
Psychology of Intuitive Judgment (Thomas Gilovich et al. eds. 2002). 
159 Indeed, the extreme awards that receive media attention are, according to some, too rare to be a matter 
of concern. See Deborah Jones Merritt and Kathryn Ann B
Empirical Evidence, 60 Ohio St. L.J. 315 (1999). A similar
arry, Is the Tort System in Crisis? New 
 argument has been made about punitive 
mages;
160 See Timur Kuran and Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, Stan L Rev (1999). 
da  see Theodore Eisenberg, Neil LaFountain, Brian Ostrom, David Rottman, and Martin T. Wells, 
Juries, Judges, and Punitive Damages: An Empirical Study, 87 Cornell L. Rev. 743 (2002) (arguing that 
punitive damages are roughly correlated with compensatory damages); but see and Joni Hersch and W. Kip 
Viscusi, Punitive Damages, 33 J. Legal Stud. 1 (2004) (disputing this claim). 
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 This reasoning is not implausible, and sometimes averages are appropriate despite 
their crudeness; but they can lead regulators astray. Some regulations affect only persons 
of type X, and other regulations affect only persons of type Y; then different valuations 
should be used. Indeed, we know that some regulations protect people against cancer, a 
risk that people are willing to pay a premium to avoid, whereas other regulations protect 
people against sudden unanticipated death, a risk that occasions less in the way of public 
concern.161 So too, some regulations affect the poor more than the rich, urban people 
more than rural people, and so forth. Under the very theory that animates current 
regulatory practice, individualized VSLs, taking account of these differences, are 
important. 
 Second, regulatory decisions affect more people than a tort award does, and thus 
are more politically salient. The greater political salience of regulatory decisions may 
 
 problems for those who believe that ethical 
rinciples require all deaths to be valued the same way. But it appears to be politically 
difficult to draw the logical conclusion that VSLs for poor people should be lower than 
have good effects simply because public scrutiny can be a corrective against ill-motivated 
or foolish decisions; but here we focus on some bad or troubling effects. The most 
obvious is that the symbolism of sensible and disaggregated regulatory decisions may 
bother people because such decisions seem in conflict with other values—here, we have 
in mind the controversy valuing human lives at all, or the likely more intense controversy
over valuing the lives of the rich more than the lives of the poor.162 The risks of public 
skepticism may also explain agencies’ failure to value the lives of children properly and 
openly.  
By contrast, the isolation of tort awards suppresses these symbolic concerns. 
Almost no one complains about the fact that poor people obtain lower damages in tort 
awards because they have lost less future income; and the existence of the disparity, and 
its longstanding character, at least raises
p
VSLs for rich people in regulatory decisionmaking. 
 
                                                 
161 See Revesz, supra note; Hammit and Liu, supra note. 
162 Consider the controversy over the idea of “life years,” an idea that strikes many people as ethically 
problematic because it treats elderly people as less valuable than younger people. See Ackerman and 
Heinzerling, supra note. 
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 We are unable to explain why agencies have neglected the losses to dependents. 
One possible answer is that agencies assume that victims’ WTPs for bearing risks of 
death incorporate these costs; but as we have explained, it is unlikely that these WTPs 
incorporate these costs fully. Another possible answer is lack of information; it is not 
easy to generate a plausible number to capture the costs to dependents on some 
population-wide basis. But this problem ought to be remediable. A probable contributor 
to the gap is that cost-benefit analysis and the use of VSLs is in its infancy—as a formal 
part of regulatory law, it is only about twenty-five years old163—and agencies have 
focused on the large problems while neglecting or overlooking more subtle issues. But it 
is now time for the VSL methodology to advance to a new stage of sophistication. 
rded? It is clear that wealth differences would have been seen in wrongful death 
and su
sult of simple “noise” in the system. 
Second, suppose that an agency had, prior to the 9/11 attack, issued regulations 
designed to force the owners of buildings such as the World Trade Center to install safety 
a terrorist attack or similar disaster. Here, 
B. September 11 and Compensation 
 The different orientations of tort and regulatory law were reflected in an 
interesting way by the decisionmaking process of the commission that was set up to 
award compensation to victims of the 9/11 terrorist attack. We have briefly outlined the 
resulting regulations. Before returning to this topic, let us conduct two thought 
experiments. 
 First, suppose that Congress had never set up the 9/11 compensation fund, and 
instead the victims and survivors had sued under state tort law. Suppose they succeeded 
in establishing the liability of defendants such as the airlines. How would damages have 
been awa
rvivors’ awards. The dependents of investment bankers would have obtained 
awards far in excess of those obtained by the dependents of fire fighters. In addition, the 
awards would have varied significantly in light of the different characteristics of each 
victim. But there also would have been considerable inexplicable variance in the awards, 
variance that would not be traceable to relevant factors but to the vagaries of jury 
decisionmaking and the law of tort. Hence inequalities would have been pervasive—
some a justified product of existing rules, others a re
 
devices that would have saved lives in case of 
                                                 
163 See Executive Order 12291, supra. 
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we can be sure that the agency would have used uniform valuations—such as $6.1 
million per life saved—that would have ignored wealth differences and other differences 
between victims. The agency would also have ignored dependents. 
 How did the 9/11 commission make its decisions? On the one hand, the 
commission was directed by Congress to rely on tort principles, and for that reason it 
used formulas that took into account wealth differences.164 Estates of investment bankers 
did receive more compensation than estates of fire fighters.165 In addition, awards were 
an increasing function of the number of dependents. On the other hand, public and 
political discomfort with these disparate awards—which seemed to dishonor the fire 
fighters, and also to distinguish victims along class lines—led the commission to adopt 
awards that were less dispersed than would have occurred under the tort system.166 
he 9/11 Commission combined the virtues and flaws of both approaches. 
 There is a lesson here. Because individual tort cases concern just one person or a 
few people, awards are unlikely to be politically salient or to be influenced by irrelevant 
political considerations. But because they are ex post and individualized, they usually fail 
to take advantage of information that is accessible only at the level of the general 
population. T
Because of the political salience of the task, and because awarding damages to thousands 
of people made comparison easy and obvious, the commission was constrained, like 
regulatory agencies, to use relatively uniform numbers; recall that a standard number was 
used for noneconomic damages. At the same time, arbitrariness was therefore limited—in 
the sense that people in similar circumstances received similar awards. Because the 
commission was directed to use tort principles, the numbers were not fully uniform, and a 
degree of individual variation was properly allowed. But the use of tort principles also 
made it impossible to use figures for hedonic losses, and instead the commission relied 
on flawed figures such as lost income, with the result that average awards—in the $2 to 
                                                 
164 See Explanation of Process for Computing Presumed Economic Loss, available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/victimcompensation/loss_calc_deceased.html. 
 
5 For e
illion, 
standards of lost future income typical in tort cases, while at the same time making the fund fair to all 
income groups, Mr. Feinberg [the special master] said. He ultimately devised the program to prevent it 
ncially disadvantaged, he said.”) 
16 xample, the spouse of a 40 year old with an income of $50,000 would receive a little over $1 
m whereas the spouse of a 40 year old with an income of $225,000 would receive about $3.5 million 
– not including non-economic loss. See Explanation of Process for Computing Presumed Economic Loss, 
supra. 
166 See Chen, Man Behind, supra, at B3 (“The statute suffered from two conflicting impulses: to follow the 
from favoring the wealthy over the fina
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$3 million range—were less than the hedonic losses that actually occurred, according to 
the VSL methodology used by agencies.167  
 In normal situations, significant improvements are possible. Courts can, and ought 
is that it does not include the welfare loss to the decedent; its current reliance on the 
                                      
to, take advantage of information about average persons when the relevant information 
about a particular victim is lacking (such as WTP to avoid the risk that produced 
death).168 And although politics will always constrain agencies, there are certainly many 
steps that agencies can take to improve their use of VSLs without running afoul of 
political constraints. At a minimum, we see no reason why agencies cannot estimate the 
losses to dependents of people who are killed by regulated conduct, and it seems likely to 
us that at least some kinds of individualization will be possible—by, for example, giving 
a premium for risks that are especially dreaded. 
 
Conclusion 
 In the United States, two independent bodies of law assign dollar values to deaths. 
Regulatory agencies, drawing on willingness to pay studies, use a uniform number that 
takes no account of losses to dependents and others. In wrongful death actions, courts 
attempt to compensate survivors, failing to incorporate the loss to the decedent and 
ensuring a high degree of variability in awards. For both bodies of law, deterrence is an 
important goal, and from the standpoint of deterrence, both make serious blunders. And 
for both, a key question is how to combine accuracy and administrability. 
 There are two central problems with regulatory law. First, the value of a statistical 
life is uniform rather than disaggregated. The very theory that underlies current practice 
calls for far more in the way of individuation. Second, agency figures do not include the 
losses to dependents and others; the result is underdeterrence. We have made suggestions 
about how agencies might remedy these two problems. The central problem with tort law 
decedent’s pre-death losses and the dependents’ losses results in undervaluation of 
           
167 And, bizarrely, death benefits for soldiers and public safety officials as the basis for non-economic, that 
is, mental distress, compensation for the dependents of victims. See Explanation of Process for Computing 
Presumed Economic Loss, supra. 
168 Compare the proposal of Baldus et al., supra. 
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morality risks, and hence underdeterrence. We have also made suggestions about how 
both bodies of law should deal with the deaths of children and foreigners.  
Cass R. Sunstein 
University of Chicago Law School 
1111 East 60th Street 
 If our recommendations were accepted, we would expect tort awards to become 
higher, more uniform, and less arbitrary than they currently are. We would also expect 
VSLs used by regulatory agencies to be more variable—in many cases lower and in many 
cases higher. The inclusion of losses to dependents should result in more stringent 
regulations, as the effective benefit from a life saved would be increased.  
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